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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Adverse Possession-Color of Title.
X, the owner in fee simple of realty, had in 1912 conveyed to A
who went into possession but did not register his deed. Later in the
same year A conveyed to B who registered his deed immediately. After
several registered mesne conveyances, the property was finally conveyed in 1924 to plaintiffs, who immediately registered their deed.
Plaintiffs claim title by adverse possession under the registered deeds
as color of title. A creditor of X claims title under judgments 'against
X which were obtained and docketed in 1925. Held, seven years
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possession under the registered deeds constitutes sufficient possession
under color of title and bars the judgment creditor's claim.'
Color of title has been defined as being a writing upon its face
professing to pass title, but which fails to, either from want of title in
the person making it or defect in the mode of conveyance. The defect
must not be so obvious and plain that no man of ordinary capacity
would be misled by it.2 Possession for seven years under color of
title by statute in North Carolina results in a bar against other claim3
ants.
The Connor Act, 4 passed in 1885, requires the registration of a
conveyance of land before it-will become effective to pass the property
as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from
the grantor. Before the Connor Act an unregistered deed was held
to constitute color of title. 5 Austin v. Staten,0 however, in applying
the Connor Act held that where one makes a deed for land and the
grantee fails to register it, but enters into possession thereunder and
remains therein for more than seven years, such deed does not constitute color of title as against a grantee in a subsequent registered deed
given for a valuable consideration. Other North Carolina cases are
in accord with Austin v. Staten where a common source of title is
involved. 7 In Collins v. Davis8 the court followed Austin v. Staten
on a similar set of facts, but said by way of dictum that the rule of that
case did not mean that unregistered deeds could never be color of title,
and except for cases coming within the rule of that case, the rights
acquired by adverse possession for seven years under color of title are
not disturbed or affected by the Connor Act. Justice Hoke in Janney
v. Robbins9 said the principle of Austin v. Staten did not extend to a
'Glass et al. v. Lynchburg Shoe Co. et aL 212-N. C. 70, 192 S. E. 899 (1937).
'Tate v. Southard, 10 N. C. 119 (1824); Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. C. 314,
324, 51 S. E. 889, 892 (1905); Seals v. Seals, 165 N. C. 409, 413,'81 S. E. 613,
614 (1914) ; Crocker et al. v. Vann et al., 192 N. C. 422, 429, 135 S. E. 127, 131
(1926).

-IN. C. CODn

ANN. (Michie, 1935) §428.
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3309.
'Campbell et al. v. McArthur, 9 N. C. 33 (1822) ; Hardin v. Barrett, 51 N. C.
159 (1858) ; Davis v. Higgins, 91 N. C. 382 (1884) ; Hunter et al. v. Kelly et al.,
92 N. C. 285 (1885); Avent v. Arrington, 105 N. C. 377, 10 S. E. 991 (1890);
King v. McRackan, 168 N. C. 621, 624, 84 S. E. 1027, 1028 (1915) ("Prior to the
Connor Act of 1885 an unregistered deed was in all cases 'color of title if sufficient
in form.").
0126 N. C. 783, 36 S.E. 338 (1900).
'Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903) ; McClure v. Crow, 196
N. C. 657, 146 S. E. 713 (1929) ; see King v. McRackan et al., 168 N. C. 621.
624, 84 S. E. 1027, 1028, (1915) ; Buchanan v. Hedden, 169 N. C. 222, 224, 85 S.
E. 417 (1915) ; Rook v. Horton, 190 N. C. 180, 182, 129 S. E. 450, 451 (1925).
p132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903).
9141 N. C. 400, 53 S. E. 863 (1906) (The plaintiff and defendant claim
through sources entirely independent of each other. Held, unregistered deed was
color of title sufficient to give a good -title after possession for seven years against
a party claiming from a different source of title.).
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claim by adverse possession held continuously for the requisite time
under deeds foreign to the true title or entirely independent of the
title under which the plaintiff makes his claim.10 However, even
where the same source of title is involved, if a subsequent purchaser
is not one for value or fails so to prove, then the unregistered deed will
constitute color of title.'1 Thus it is color of title against donees.1 2
No distinction is made in the Connor Act or in the opinions of the
Court, construing and applying the statute, between the rights of
creditors and purchasers for value. In Eaton v. Doub'13 it was held
that where there is a conflicting claim between the judgment creditor
of the grantor and his grantee, whose deed is dated prior to, but not
registered at the date of the docketing of the judgment, the unregistered
deed is not color of title as against the judgment creditor, and possession
thereunder of the requisite kind and for the requisite duration will not
bar the judgment creditor's rights against the property.
The principal case relied upon Johnson v. Fry'1 4 and distinguished
Eaton v. Doub.15 However, in Johnson v. Fry those who held under
the unregistered conveyance had been in possession adversely for more
than twenty years, and it was this twenty years of adverse possession
and not seven years under color of title upon which they based their
claim and prevailed over the judgment creditor. Eaton v. Doub. distinguished by the court in the principal case, differs from the principal
case on its facts in that in Eaton v. Doub there were no recorded conveyances subsequent to the unrecorded conveyance. Does this difference warrant a different holding in the principal case? It can be forcefully argued in the affirmative, since registered deeds running back
to an unregistered deed should have the same status as registered deeds
from a person having no title. I.e., we start with the first registered
deed after the unregistered deed, and if there is seven years of possession under this first registered deed it is color of title. On the other
hand, can the purpose of the Connor Act be carried out successfully
when the first link in the chain of title is unrecorded and no one be
penalized in law simply because the plaintiff and the other grantees
in the chain of title had recorded their deeds and been in possession
under the recorded- deeds for seven years? Where the chain of title
runs back to the same party through which the creditor or purchaser
" Janney v. Robbins, 141 N. C. 400. 53 S. E. 863 (1906) ; Gore v. McPherson,
161 N. C. 638, 77 S. E. 835 (1913) ; Anderson v. Walker, 190 N. C. 826, 130 S.
E. 840 (1925).
It King v. Mc Rackan et al., 168 N. C. 621, 84 S. E. 1027 (1915); Klutz v.
Klutz, 172 N. C. 622, 90 S. E. 769 (1916).
'Dissent in Clendenin v. Clendenin, 181 N. C. 465, 107 S. E. 458 (1921).
190 N. C. 14, 128 S. E. 494 (1925).
2,195 N. C. 832, 143 S. E. 857 (1928).
" See note 13, supra.
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for value claims, then it seems that each link in the chain should be
registered because if it were, then the creditor or purchaser could rely

on the records and determine the status of the title from them. Where
the chain of title does not run back to the person from whom the creditor claims then there is more reason for not applying the Connor Act.
That would be a real case of independent or foreign source of title
where the Connor Act is inapplicable. Registration of each link or conveyance in such a case would be of no assistance to a creditor or pur-

chaser searching the record, since the registered link or conveyance
would not appear in the chain of title descending from the judgment

debtor.' 6

JAMEs

A.

WELLONS, JR.

Attorney and Client-Wrongful DischargeRemedies of Attorney.
Because it is necessary that a client have confidence in his attorney,
the courts proclaim in unison that a client has the power to discharge
his attorney at any time, with or without cause.' But there is disagreement as to the remedies of the attorney when the client has exer2
cised this privilege.
In accord with the rule applicable to the usual employer-employee
contract, the majority of jurisdictions hold that the attorney discharged
without cause may treat the contract as continuing and recover damages
for the client's breach.3 The measure of damages is usually the full
'Now suppose X, who is not the true owner of the property, makes a conveyance of it to A, who does not register it. Subsequently X makes another conveyance of the same property to B for a valuable consideration and this deed is registered but after A has held for more than seven years under his unregistered
deed. Would the Connor Act be applicable and give B title since both claim from
a common grantor or would the color of title statute apply? Registration in such
a case would be insufficient to pass title since the deeds from X are defective because of lack of title in X. Thus it would seem that in such a case the party who
first holds for seven years continuously under his deed would prevail. Both deeds
are defective since X lacks title, but both could constitute color of title. But if
A had registered his deed then B would have had notice of it and would not have
been misled.
1 Atchison v. Hulse, 107 Cal. App. 640, 290 Pac. 916 (1930) ; Lawler v. Dunn,
145 Minn. 281, 176 N. W. 989 (1920); Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E.
46, L. R. A. 1917F 406 (1916).
Generally an attorney discharged for a justifiable cause can have no recovery.
In re Badger, 9 F. (2d) 560 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Cahill v. Baird, 138 Cal. 691,
70 Pac. 1061 (1902); Holmes v. Evans, 129 N. Y. 140, 29 N. E. 233 (1891);
Bloom v. Irving Trust Co., 152 Misc. 50, 272 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1934). Contra:
Goodin v. Hays, 28 Ky. L. 112, 88 S. W. 1101 (1905) (attorney discharged for
cause allowed to recover on quantum inerudt. As to what constitutes cause, see
1 THORNTON, ATToRNEYS AT LAW (1914) 239.
'Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621, 18 Pac. 796 (1888); Moyer v. Cantieny, 41
Minn. 242, 42 N. W. 1060 (1889) ; Kent v. Fishblate, 247 Pa. 361, 93 Atl. 509
(1915).
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contract price.4 Some courts deduct from the contract price a sum
representing the proportional amount of work remaining to be done.5
If the fee is contingent, the measure of damages is reasonable compensation for services actually rendered, rather than the possible
contingent fee. 6 If the attorney prefers, he may under the majority
7
Recovery in such cases is not limited
view sue in quantum reruit.

to the contract price.8
Following the lead of New York, several states have turned down
the majority view and hold that there is an implied term in every contract that the client may terminate the relationship without any further
liability other than payment'for the reasonable value of services actually
rendered. 9 This view is limited to the employment of an attorney for
a specific purpose, and does not apply to a general retainer contract
for a definite period of time,' 0 which is more in the nature of an ordinary master-servant contract than one for professional services."- According to the New York courts, the so-called "right" of the client to
protection if the attorney still
discharge his attorney is not sufficient
2
has his action for the contract price.'
Though intended to protect the client, this quantum meruit rule
13
backfired to the client's injury in the case of In re Montgomery.
'Mutter v. Burgess, 87 Colo. 580, 290 Pac. 269 (1930) ; Whittle v. Tompkins,
94 S. C. 237, 77 S. E. 929 (1913) ; Sessions v. Warwick, 46 Wash. 165, 89 Pac.
482 (1907).
'Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545 (1878); Bowser v. Patrick, 23 Ky. L. 1578,
65 S. W. 824 (1901) ; cf. Searson v. Sams, 142 S. C. 558, 141 S. E. 107 (1928)
(Wrongfully discharged attorneys were held entitled to recover from their clients
the contract price, less an agreed reduction for the services yet to be performed.).
'Owens v. Bolt, 218 Ala. 344, 118 So. 590 (1928); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Semmes, 73 Md. 9, 20 Atl. 127 (1890); Clayton v. Martin, 108 W. Va. 571, 151
S. E. 855 (1930).
French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 797 (1898); Philbrook v.
Moxey, 191 Mass. 33, 77 N. E. 520 (1906) ; Shevalier v. Doyle, 88 Neb. 560, 130
N. W. 417 (1911).
'Lessing v. Gibbons, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 598, 45 P. (2d) 258 (1935) ; Thompson
v. Smith, 248 S. W. 1070 (Tex. 1923).
'Louque v. Dejan, 129 La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911) ; Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn.
281, 176 N. W. 989 (19W0) ; Martin v. Camp, 219,N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46, L. R.
A. 1917F 406 (1916); Ritz v. Carpenter, 43 S. D. 236, 178 N. W. 877 (1920);
Enos v. Keating, 39 Wyo. 217, 271 Pac. 6 (1928).
"Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46, L. R. A. 1917F 406 (1916) ;
Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 230 N. Y. 70, 129 N. E. 211 (1920).
1 Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okla. 161, 235 Pac. 502 (1924) held that
when the attorney entered the general employment of his client, he "changed his
position" by giving up other clients and incurring expenses. Hence, when wrongfully discharged he could recover as damages the fees provided by the contract.
But to follow this reasoning would be to destroy the New York rule. An attorney
would always change his position when he accepted employment in that he could
not later serve the adverse party.
"The courts will not specifically enforce contracts of personal service (see
5 WILISTOiN-. CoNTRAcTs (rev. ed. 1937) §1423A; RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs
(1932) §379); hence the only possible benefit the client could derive from a
"right to discharge" would be to prevent his being bound by the attorney's acts.
"272 N. Y. 323, 6 N. E. (2d) 40, 109 A- L. R. 674 (1937), (1937) 6 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 462; (1937) 25 GFmo. L. J. 734; (1937) 21 MINN. L. Rrv. 863;
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Here the contract price was $5,000; the reasonable value of the attorney's services, $13,000. The court awarded the plaintiff $13,000,
saying that since the contract had been cancelled it could not limit
recovery. 14 The result is undesirable. Clients in the future will not
feel free to discharge their attorneys if there is a possibility that quantum meruit will exceed the contract price.15
In applying the New York rule, the courts are faced with the
problem of what factors should be considered in determining quantun
mneruit. The amount and character of the services rendered, labor,
time and trouble, character and importance of the litigation, the professional standing of counsel, financial responsibility of the client, even
the contract price-all these have been held relevant. 16 The detriment
to the attorney, rather than the benefit resulting to the client, is the
17
prime consideration.
Both the New York and majority views have been severely criticized. The attack on New York's quantum reruit view, led by Williston,' 8 involves these points: (1) The attorney has lost the chance to
serve the adverse party; and if discharged before he has rendered any
substantial service, his quantum meruit recovery would be negligible,
whereas his actual loss might be considerable. But, it might be answered, if the attorney has actually suffered loss in this manner, it might
well be considered by the jury in determining the amount of recovery.
(2) The client can unjustifiably deprive the attorney of the benefits of
the contract, except as to a right of restitution, though the services
were substantially complete. But where there is any considerable discrepancy between the contract price and quantum meruit, the inference is strong that the attorney has taken advantage of his position to
impose on the client. (3) Quantum mneruit is difficult to determine.
True, but it is nevertheless closer to the just fee than is the contract
price. (4) The attorney might recover much more than the contract
price, as in In re Montgomery. However, it is doubtful if the rule of
this case will be followed by the other minority jurisdictions. Under
the minority view neither party is regarded as being at fault, hence
(1937) 14N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 527; (1937) 23 VA. L. RFv. 601; (1936) 21 CORN.
L. Q. 455.
"Accord: In re Krooks, 257 N. Y. 329, 178 N. E. 548 (1931) ; It re Tillman,
259 N. Y. 133, 181 N. E. 75 (1932).
"The same criticism is valid as to the majority rule, which allows the attorney
to sue in quantum ineruit if he desires and which does not limit recovery to the
contract price.
" Starin v. Mayor of N. Y., 106 N. Y. 82, 12 N. E. 643 (1887) ; In. re Potts'
Estate, 213 App. Div. 59, 209 N. Y. Supp. 655 (1925) ; French v. Roberts Abbott
Pub. Co., 223 App. Div. 276, 228 N. Y. Supp. 62 (1928) ; It re Montgomery, 272
N. Y. 323, 6 N. E. (2d) 40, 109 A. L. R. 674 (1937).
'French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 797 (1898).
'4 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS (rev. ed. 1936) §1029. See also Notes (1917) 2
CoRx. L. Q. 109; (1920) 4 MINN. L. REv. 441.
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the contract price should limit recovery, as is true in the case of death
of one of the parties. 19
On the other hand, the majority view is weak 20 in that: (1) The
attorney may have done almost no work, may have suffered no loss,
yet he can recover the full contract price. (2) Unlike other cases of
breach of a personal service contract, there is no duty to minimize
damages, and the courts do not subtract what the plaintiff earns in
other employment during the contract period. 21 (3) The client, even
though dissatisfied, will likely allow the attorney to continue in his
employment, rather than pay the full stipulated fee. This is not in
accord with the public policy of encouraging the client to bieak the
relationship when he has ceased to have confidence in his attorney.
It is uncertain which view the North Carolina court will adopt
when the problem is squarely presented. There are only two North
Carolina cases bearing even remotely on the problem, and they furnish
little light. In Johnston v. Cutchin,22 plaintiff was to receive fourninths of any sums he might recover from the estate of the father of
his clients. He sued the estate but failed to obtain a judgment. In a
later action his clients were represented by a different attorney and
recovered. The court denied plaintiff's claim to four-ninths of the sum,
since he himself had recovered nothing from the estate. However, the
court added that if his clients "prevented him from further prosecuting their demand and claim against the executors after the failure
of the first action, he may have his remedy against them by a civil
action, but he can claim no lien upon the recovery as equitable assignee." 23 In another oblique decision, Hamne v. Lineberger,24 the
attorney was employed to institute an action for damages to property
caused by the diversion and contamination of water. He recovered
judgment for his client, who refused to pay on the ground that he was
required to sign an easement and his wife would not join in the conveyance. The attorney was allowed to recover his fee, since he had
fully discharged all duties he was employed to perform.
These decisions leave North Carolina free t6 follow whichever rule
seems wiser. Since the attack on the majority view appears justifiable,
it is to be hoped that North Carolina, when the question arises, will
see fit to follow New York, with the additional stipulation that the
recovery shall in no case exceed the contract price.
CHAS. AYcocK POE.
Sargent v. New York Cent. & H. R. R., 209 N. Y. 360, 103 N. E. 164 (1913);
see RESTATEiENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §468 (1), (3).
See Notes (1921) 30 YALE L. J.514; (1936) 21 CORN. L. Q. 455.
Dixon v. Volunteer Co-op. Bank, 213 Mass. 345, 100 N. E. 655 (1913).
"133 N. C. 119, 45 S.E. 522 (1903).
"Id.at 123, 45 S. E. at 523.
24 199 N. C. 342, 154 S. E. 313 (1930).
'
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Bankruptcy-Priority of Claims for Taxes-Personal
Liability of Trustee in Bankruptcy for Neglecting
to Pay Taxes.
The trustee in bankruptcy for a Delaware corporation distributed
assets and wound up the bankrupt estate without paying franchise taxes
due to the state of Delaware. The State sought to hold the trustee
personally liable for failure to give to the tax claims the priority conferred upon them by the National Bankruptcy Act. Held, in the absence of an allegation that the trustee had knowledge of the existence
of the taxes, the defendant trustee was entitled to judgment on the
pleadings.'
The priority given claims for taxes in bankruptcy proceedings is
required by two statutes. The first, enacted in 1797 and still in effect
with modifications, applies generally to the various types of liquidation,
including bankruptcy. It provides that "debts due to the United States
shall be first satisfied ' 2 and imposes personal liability upon the trustee
or other liquidator who fails to respect such priority in distributing the
assets of an insolvent estate. 3 The second statute, the Bankruptcy Act
itself, supersedes the first to the extent that, in bankruptcies, certain
wage claims are to be satisfied before taxes, that priority is given to
state, county, district, and municipal as well as federal taxes, and that
all taxes are given precedence over non-tax debts due the United
States. 4 Where the bankrupt's assets are not sufficient to satisfy the
claims of all taxing units, it has been held that the United States, the
states, and municipalities are to share pro rata in the payment of
taxes." The .priority afforded taxes under the Bankruptcy Act does not
extend to taxes already secured by a lien upon the property taxed.0
Tax claims need not be proved in the same manner as other claims.
It is said that claims for taxes are not claims for "debts" in the ordinary sense of the word; that the rights and remedies of a sovereign
are not limited by a statute unless the sovereign is specifically men'Delaware v. Irving Trust Co., 92 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).

1R2 STAT. §3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. A. §191 (1927); United States v.
Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 2 L. ed. 304 (U. S. 1804) (statute held constitutional);
Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492, 46 Sup. Ct. 180, 70 L. ed. 373 (1926)
("debts
due to the United States" construed to include federal taxes).
3
REv. STAT. §3467 (1875) as amended 48 STAT. 760, 31 U. S. C. A. §192 (Supp.

1936).

'30

STAT.

563 as amended 32,STAT. 800, 34

U. S. C. A. §104 (1937).

STAT.

267, and 44

STAT.

666, 11

'Missouri v. Ross, 299 U. S.72, 57 Sup. Ct. 60, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 6 (1936);
Waterman Mfg. Co., 291 Fed. 589 (D. Me. 1923); In re Wyley Co., 292
Fed. 900 (N. D. Ga. 1923) ; see In re Fountain, Inc., 295 Fed. 873, 874 (S.D. N.
Y. 1924) ; but cf. Spokane v. United States, 279 U. S.80, 49 Sup. Ct. 321, 73 L.
ed. 621 (1929) (holding that in a receivership, by reason of REv. STAT. §3466
(1875), 31 U. S. C. A. §191 (1927), taxes due the United States have priority over
state taxes).
"In re Dublin Veneer Co., 1 F. Supp. 313 (S.D. Ga. 1932).
litre
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tioned; and, therefore, that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
relative to the proof and allowance of claims do not bind the government.7 It follows that the present period of six months8 allowed for
the filing and proof of claims, as was true of the former one-year
period, 9 does not limit the time in which claims for taxes may be filed
and proved. 10 Indeed, it has been held that it is not necessary that
claims for taxes be filed or proved at all.11 But the bankruptcy court
is not altogether without protection against unreasonable delay in the
settlement of an estate, caused by the failure of federal, state, or local
governments to file their claims for taxes. As an incident to the
jurisdiction of the court to determine the amount and validity of
taxes, 12 the referee may, upon petition of the trustee and after service
of notice upon the proper government officials, require -tax claims to
be proved within a time fixed by the court or thereafter be barred. 13
Not infrequently a claim for taxes, as was true in the principal
case, will not be presented until the trustee has distributed the assets of
the bankrupt in whole or in part. In such event what is the responsibility of the trustee? A trustee in bankruptcy, -like any other trustee,
is personally liable for a breach of duty. As one court expressed it:
"His duties and responsibilities are as heavy as those of other
trustees, including administrators and executors. ....
If in the performance of . . . duties he violates the law or acts so negligently or
carelessly as to inflict loss upon the estate or persons interested therein,
he must answer in damages' according to the principles applied to any
14
trustee or fiduciary."
The trustee has been held personally liable for breach of duty both
'In re Brezin, 297 Fed. 300 (D. N. J. 1924); In re De Angeles, 36 F. (2d)

218 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929); In re Servel, 45 F. (2d) 660 (E. D. Idaho 1930)

(claims for taxes need not be verified).
830 STAT. 561 as amended 44 STAT. 666, 11 U. S. C. A. §93 (n) (Supp. 1936).
130 STAT. 561, 11 U. S. C. A. §93 (n) (1927).
"Period of six months: In re Rheem, 78 F. (2d) 740 (App. D. C. 1935);
In re Reimer, 82 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). One year period: In re Cleanfast'Hosiery Co., 4 Am. B. R. 702 (S. D. N. Y. 1900); In re Menist Co., 294
Fed. 532 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); In re Brezin, 297 Fed. 300 (D. N. J. 1924); Vil-

lere v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927), cert. denied 275 U. S.
532, 48 Sup. Ct. 29, 72 L. ed. 410 (1927).

"In re Chandler Motors of New England, Inc., 17 F. (2d) 998 (D. Mass.
1926).
"30

STAT.

563; 11 U. S. C. A. §104 (a) (1937); New Jersey v. Anderson,

203 U. S. 483, 27 Sup. Ct. 137, 51 L. ed. 284 (1906) (bankruptcy court had juris-

diction to decide whether New Jersey franchise tax was "tax" within meaning of
the Bankruptcy Act.).
"New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S. 329, 53 Sup. Ct. 389, 77 L. ed. 815
(1933) ; In re Anderson, 279 Fed. 525 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; In re Stavin, 12 F.

(2d) 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1925) ; In re Morgenstern, 57 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 2d.
1932) ; United States v. Elliot,. 57 F. (2d) .843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) ("bar order"
may be revoked within the discretion of the court in order to permit proof of
claims for taxes after the designated period has expired).
"In re Montgomery and Son, 17 F. (2d) 404, 405 (N. D. Ohio 1927).
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for failure to collect 1 5 or conserve'8 assets and for improper distribution thereof. Disbursements to creditors are to be made by the trustee
under orders from the referee, and the trustee has been found negligent where he made improper payments without securing such an
order.1 7 However, the fact that the trustee has acted pursuant to the
referee's orders is not, in itself, a defense.18 The trustee's duty is
to see that the assets of the estate are properly distributed; and if he is
aware, or reasonably should be aware that the order is wrong, or if a
payment is erroneously ordered at the request of the trustee or because
he neglects to give proper information to the referee, then the order is
not a defense.
If a trustee, having notice of taxes owed by the bankrupt, distributes
the assets of the estate without paying the taxes, clearly he is guilty
of a breach of duty and should be held personally responsible. But if
the trustee has no notice of the existence of the taxes, and without paying them winds up the estate under orders of the court, as in the principal case, his liability, if any, must be predicated upon the breach of an
affirmative duty to search for taxes and bring them to the attention of
the court.
Numerous dicta support the proposition that a duty to search for
taxes does exist. 19 For example in In re Kallak20 the court said:
"It is the duty of the trustee to ascertain from the public records
the amount due for taxes and bring the matter to the attention
of the court .. "
On the other hand, in United States v. Eyges,21 a federal district court
squarely held that the- trustee is under no duty to search for taxes
and cannot be held personally liable in the absence of notice of their
existence. Furthermore, it is to be observed that in the cases in which
the trustee in bankruptcy has been charged personally with responsibility for failure to pay taxes or debts due the United States there
has been some element of notice present.2 2 The decision in the prin'In re Reinboth, 157 Fed. 672 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907); In re Kuhn Bros., 234
Fed. 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916).
"Carson, Pierce, Scott and Co. v. Turner, 61 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
'In re Rude, 101 Fed. 805 (D. Ky. 1900) ; In re Hoyt and Mitchell, 127 Fed.
968 (E. D. N. C. 1904).
"Louisville Woolen Mills v. Tapp, 239 Fed. 463 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); In re
Montgomery and Son, 17 F. (2d) 404 (N, D. Ohio 1927) ; see In re Cobb, 112
Fed. 655, 656 (E. D. N. C. 1901).
" Stanard v. Dayton, 220 Fed. 441, 444 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); In re Montgomery and Son 17 F. (2d) 404, 406 (N. D. Ohio 1927); In re De Angeles, 36
F. (2d) 218, 219 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929) ; In rc Servel 45 F. (2d) 660, 661 (E. D.
Idaho 1930).
"147 Fed. 276, 277 (D. N. I. 1906).
"286 Fed. 683 (D. Mass. 1923).
'United States v. Barnes, 31 Fed. 705 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1887) (taxes);
Dallas v. Menezes, 16 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) (taxes) ; Re Monsarrat,
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cipal case, therefore, rests upon sound authority; but the question of
the existence of a duty to search has never been settled by the Supreme
Court, and, in view of the dicta to the effect that there is such a duty,
a different result might be reached in that Court.
It cannot be denied that there is merit in the conclusion that an
absolute duty to search for and discover all taxes owed by a bankrupt
should not be imposed upon a trustee. The probability that certain
types of taxes are due should be obvious to the trustee, but others
are more obscure, and the most diligent search might not reveal the
existence of all of them. Perhaps it would impose a great hardship to
require the trustee of a bankrupt Delaware corporation to discover at
his peril every tax levied upon the bankrupt by the states of Idaho,
Oregon, and California, but it does not seem that a rule which would
require the trustee to ascertain the existence of franchise taxes owed to
the state under which the bankrupt was incorporated would be unduly
rigorous. The latter burden seems even less severe when as in the
principal case the trustee is an incorporated trust company, familiar
with and experienced in the administration of bankrupt estates, and
when it is remembered that a trustee may always resort to a bar order
to compel a lazy or uninformed tax official to file claims for taxes.
In following the policy of protecting a trustee against responsibility for
failure to pay tardy tax claims of which he was never aware, the policy
of insuring the adequacy of public revenues, which lies behind the priority statutes, should not be overlooked. Might not the court, while refusing to impose an absolute duty to search for and ascertain the
existence of tax claims, nevertheless require of the trustee that reasonable efforts be directed toward their discovery?
MOSES BRAXTON GILLAM, JR.
Carriers-Duties to Persons Accompanying
Passengers-Assaults.
Plaintiff, who had entered the station of the defendant railway
station for the purpose of meeting a fellow mail clerk to take him
home,' was assaulted by the general manager of the defendant. The
provocation was the fact that the plaintiff had testified adversely to
the defendant in a hearing before the Corporation Commission. Held,
25 Am. B. R. 820 (D. Hawaii 1911) sentble (taxes); United Sattes v. Dewey,

39 Fed. 251 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1889) (debt due the United States); United
States v. Kaplan, 74 F. (2d) 664 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (debt due the United
States).
'Record on Appeal, p. 15, Snow v. Debutts and A. and Y. Ry., 212 N. C. 120,
193 S. E. 224 (1937).
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defendant railway company is not liable for the assault of its agent
since he was acting outside the scope of his employment.2
An adequate treatment of the problem involved here necessarily
requires a consideration of the duty of a carrier to protect the following classes of persons from assaults: (a) passengers; (b) invitees;
(c) licensees ;3 (d)trespassers. Although a carrier isnot an absolute
insurer of the safety of its passengers, 4 it does have an absolute duty to
protect them from assaults by employees, 5 and to exercise a high degree
of care to prevent assaults by co-passengers8 or strangers.7 As to invitees, licensees, and trespassers, there is merely the duty to prevent
assaults by employees committed in the course of employment.8 Invitees
are owed the additional duty of protection from assaults by third
parties, which reasonably could have been foreseen.9
'Snow v. Debutts and A. and Y. Ry., 212 N. C. 120, 193 S. E. 224 (1937).
'A licensee is one who enters the premises for his own purposes under a permission to do so. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Lackner, 246 Fed. 931 (C. C. A. 3d,
1917) ; Hyde v. Atlantic and W. R. R. R, 47 Ga. App. 139, 169 S.E. 854 (1933) ;
Bullock v. New York Central R. R., 152 App. Div. 132, 142 N. Y. Supp. 219
(1913) ; Gillis v. Pennsylvania R. R., 59 Pa. 129 (1868) ; International and G. N.
Ry. v. Kent, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 272, 124 S.W. 179 (1909). An invitee is one who
comes upon the premises pursuant to an invitation which the carrier holds out
to those of the public who enter in the interest of the passenger and/or the carrier.
St Louis, I. M. and S. Ry. v. Grimsley, 90 Ark. 64, 117 S.W. 1064 (1909) ; Atlantic and B. Ry. v. Owens, 123 Ga. 393, 51 S. E. 404 (1905); Fournier v. New
York, N. H., and H. R. R., 286 Mass. 7, 189 N. E. 574 (1934); Fortune v.
Southern Ry., 150 N. C. 695, 46 S.E. 759 (1909) ; Dougherty v. Davis, 48 N. D.
883, 187 N. W. 616 (1922); St. Louis and S. F. R. R. v. Stacy, 77 Okla. 165,
171 Pac. 870 (1918); Hamilton v. Texas and P. Ry., 64 Tex. 251 (1885); Note
(1934) 92 A. L. R. 614. Some courts have confused the two classifications and
have held that -those persons who come on the premises in the interests of the
passenger and/or the carrier are licensees. Izlor v. Manchester and A. R. R.,
57 S.C. 332, 35 S.E. 583 (1900); Galveston, H. and S. A. R. R. v. Matzdorf,
102 Tex. 42, 112 S.W. 1036 (1908). However the majority hold them to be
invitees. 3 Euiorr, RAILROADS (3d ed. 1921) §1794; Note (1893) 29 Am. St.
Rep. 54.
The Korea Maru, 254 Fed. 397, 399 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) ("Although the
carrier does nbt insure that the passenger will be carried safely, still it is bound
to exercise as high a degree of care, skill, and diligence in receiving a passenger,
conveying him to his ;destination, and setting him down safely, as the means of
conveyance employed and the circumstances of the case will permit.") ; Owens v.
Wilmington and W. Ry., 126 N. C. 139, 141, 35 S.E. 259, 260 (1900).
'Bledsoe v. West, 186 Mo. App. 460, 171 S.W. 622 (1914); Williams v. Gill,
122 N. C. 967, 29 S.E. 879 (1898); Neville v. Southern Ry., 126 Tenn. 96, 146
S. W. 846 (1912) ; Whitlock v. Northern Pacific Ry., 59 Wash. 15, 109 Pac. 188
(1910); 5 ELLIoTr, RAImROADS (3d ed. 1922) §2887.
'Hines v. Miniard, 208 Ala. 176, 94 So. 302 (1922); New Orleans, St. L.
and1 C. R. R. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200 (1876).
Southern Ry. v. Haynes, 186 Ala. 60, 65 So. 339 (1914) ; Seawell v. Carolina
Central R. t, 132 N. C. 856, 44 S.E. 620 (1903).
B Lynch v. Florida Central R. R., 113 Ga. 1105, 39 S.E. 411 (1901) ; Central
of Georgia Ry. v. Morris, 121 Ga. 484, 49 S.E. 606 (1904): Hudson v. Missouri,
K. and T. Ry., 16 Kan. 470 (1876); Mead v. Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry., 68 Mo.
App. 92 (1896) ; Daniel v. Petersburg R. R., 117 N. C. 592, 23 S.E. 327 (1895) ;
Pierce v. North Carolina R. R., 124 N. C. 83, 32 S.E. 399 (1899); Cook v.
Southern Ry. 128 N. C. 333, 38 S.E. 925 (1901) ; 3 ELLioTT, RAILROADS (3d ed.
1921) §1805; PIMcE RAILROADS (1881) 277.
BBlaisdell v. Long Island R. R, 152 App. Div. 218, 136 N. Y. Supp. 768
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The rule laid down in the principal case seems unobjectionable
when applied to trespassers and licensees. Licensees, for example,
peddlers, newsboys, those using restrooms, coming to the station to
see distinguished visitors, or coming there to transact business purely
personal to them and employees of the carrier, are on the premises
with the bare permission of the carrier for their own private purposes
and have no connection with the passengers or the business of transporting them. However, another rule, imposing greater liability upon
the carrier, should be applied to invitees reasonably necessary to passengers, for instance, persons carrying bags, assisting children or the
aged or infirm to board or alight from trains, or transporting passengers to and from the station and aiding in their departure. Likewise, although it must be admitted that the case is weaker, this same
increased liability should be extended to invitees present for the mere
convenience of passengers, such as persons greeting incoming friends
or bidding farewell to those departing. Both of these classes of persons are at the station to facilitate the very function that the carrier
holds itself out to perform.
It would seem that the courts should cease basing the liability of
the carrier to both the above types of invitees solely upon the doctrine
of respondeat superior.10 When the assaults are committed -by the carrier's own employees, then the invitee should be protected by the same
rule which is applicable to passengers, i.e., hold the carrier liable
whether or not the employee is' acting within the scope of his employment. These invitees are there in connection with the passengers, and
consequently, in direct connection with the carrier's business of transporting passengers. They are reasonably necessary to the convenience,
well-being, and safety of the passengers, and the policy of permitting
their assistance in helping travelers to and from trains has proved to
be a good business procedure for the carrier because it has built up
good will, thus increasing passenger traffic.'" Likewise, it has proved
to be a matter of practical necessity, for otherwise the carrier would be
forced to greater expense in adequately rendering its services to the
public. In addition, the vast distinction between the nature of a private
and a public enterprise should justify the application of different rules
to each. The public business must extend the use of its facilities to all
who come to avail, or to aid others in availing, themselves of the services which it renders to the public; whereas, in contrast, the private
business is not required to do so, but may deal with whom it pleases.
(1912); contra, Houston and T. C. R. R. v. Phillio, 96 Tex. 18, 69 S. W. 994
(1902).
"See note 8, mtpra.
'See Little Rock and F. S. Ry. v. Lawton, 55 Ark. 428, 432, 18 S. W. 543,
544 (1892); (1932) 11 CHu.-K NT Rzv. 31, 35.
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Some courts have applied the rule advocated by this note in order
to hold the carrier liable in cases involving negligence. 12 In those
instances the courts have declared that the invitee was either a passenger or that he was due the same protection as the passenger whom
he was assisting.
However, if it is not considered feasible to adopt a rule of absolute
liability, a compromise might be reached as suggested by one court,
in declaring that the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition for invitees includes a duty to use due care to protect them
from illegal assaults by employees, whether acting within the scope of
13
their employment or not.
HENRY IRWIN COFFIELD, JR.

Constitutional Law-Electricity-Federal Loans to
Erect Publicly Owned Electric Plants.
Defendant county and defendant Ickes, administrator of public
works, entered into a contract for a loan and grant of federal funds
to the county for the construction of a publicly owned electric plant.
The plaintiff power company, operating in the area under a nonexclusive franchise, sought to restrain the execution of the agreement
on the.ground that the act under which federal aid was extended was
unconstitutional, and that the ensuing competition would seriously
damage its business. The district court granted the injunction.' The
circuit court of appeals remanded the case for reconsideration in the
light of a new contract between the defendants 2 (omitting rate control
by the administrator) .3 The trial court adhered to its original decision ;4 the circuit court reversed the decision, holding the act constitutional. 5 The Supreme Court held, per curiam, that the remand, without vacating the decree of the lower court, had unduly limited the rehearing, and sent the case back for another hearing." This time the
district court held the act constitutional.7 On the third appearance
' Louisville and N. R. R. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542, 21 N. E. 31 (1889) ; Evansville and T. H. R. R. v. Athon, 6 Ind. App. 295, 33 N. E. 469 (1893) ; Galloway
v. Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry., 87 Iowa 458, 54 N. W. 447 (1893) ; Cherokee Packet
Co. v. Hilson, 95 Tenn. 1, 31 S. W. 737 (1895) ; Texas and P. Ry. v. McGilvary.
29 S. W. 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); 5 EuLr.rr, RAILROADS (3d ed. 1922) §2388,

n. 65.
"Krantz v. Rio Grande W. Ry., 12 Utah 104, 41 Pac. 717 (1895).

'Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 10 F. Supp. 854 (W. D. S. C. 1935).
- Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 79 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
No change has ever been made in the rates originally adopted by the county
and approved by the administrator.
'Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 12 F. Supp. 70 (W. D. S. C. 1935).
'Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
'Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 259, 57 Sup. Ct. 202. 81 L
ed. Adv. Ops. 149 (1936).
Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 19 F. Supp. 932 (W. D. S. C. 1937).
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of the case in the circuit court of appeals, held, Title II of the N.I.R.A.8
is constitutional as a valid exercise of the spending power under the
general welfare clause; it is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment or
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; and, as the
county has a right to compete with the plaintiff, any damage suffered
is absque injuria, and the plaintiff is without standing to raise the issue
of the constitutionality of the federal appropriation. 9
It is apparently settled that the plaintiff is not entitled as a federal
taxpayer to question the validity of a federal appropriation.10 However, the power company's non-exclusive franchise is property within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and will be protected against
illegal competition.'
That the franchise does not protect its holder
from. lawful competition by a municipality or county is well recognized. 12 But the construction of a competing municipal plant may be
enjoined by an existing utility as a franchise holder, where the construction if allowed would be illegally financed, as, for instance, by
the issuance of bonds in violation of a statutory or constitutional debt
limitation.' 3 In such cases, the municipality's "right" to compete is
unquestioned, yet the franchise holder has a standing in court to contest the legality of the financing arrangement.Y4 It would seem, then,
in the principal case that, though the county has an admitted right to
compete with the plaintiff,' 5 the validity of the complete financing
848 STAT. 200 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §401 (1934).
'Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 91 F.
cert. granted Oct. 25, 1937, 58 Sup. Ct 120, 82 L.
"lFrothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43
(1923); cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1,

(2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937),
ed. Adv. Ops. 36 (1937).
Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. ed. 1078

56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. 477
(1936) (where the taxpayer was allowed to question the validity of the tax as
a step in an unauthorized plan to regulate agriculture by expenditure of the earmarked tax proceeds) ; Helvering v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 904, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
804 (1937) (where the constitutionality of old age benefit payments was determined in a stockholder's suit to restrain the corporation from paying the excise

tax).
'Frost v. Corp. Comm., 278 U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235, 73 L. ed. 483 (1928).
" Madera Water Works v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454, 33 Sup. Ct. 571, 57 L. ed.
915 (1913) ; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 54 Sup.
Ct. 542, 78 L. ed. 1025 (1934) ; Little Falls Electric & Water Co. v. Little Falls,
102 Fed. 663 (C. C. Minn. 1900).
"Campbell v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 55 F. (2d) 560 (C. C. A. 8th,
1932); Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Centralia, 11 F. Supp. 874 (E. D. Ill.
1935); Oklahoma Utilities Co. v. Hominy, 2 F. Supp. 849 (N. D. Okla. 1933).
Accord: Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Independence, 79 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 10th,
1935) (bonds authorized by an insufficient number of voters) ; Colorado Central
Power Co. v. Municipal Power Development Co., Inc., 1 F. Supp 961 (D. Colo.
1932) (city's adoption of sketchy, incomplete specifications for the plant violated
statutory requirement that the bid go to the lowest responsible bidder).
"Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. Cassill, 69 F. (2d) 703 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934)
(relief denied since financing arrangement not illegal where no debt created).
Accord: Gallardo v. Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co., 18 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A.
1st, 1927) (relief denied as financing arrangement was legal where statute authorizing governmental development of water power held valid).
"That the county's proposed action was valid under state law was conclusively
determined by the state supreme court in Park v. Greenwood County, 174 S. C.
35, 176 S. E. 870 (1934).
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of such competition by another governmental division would be subject to question by the power company as a franchise holder,10 entitling
7
it to maintain the suit.'

Though Congress may delegate to others powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself, the delegated legislation must contain a sufficiently definite standard and policy for the guidance of the
exercise of administrative discretion thereunder.' 8 While the line is
never dearly drawn between what is definite and what indefinite, an
appropriation in the present act "to reduce and relieve unemployment,"10
to be spent "with a view to increasing employment quickly" 20 on many
types of public works, including public highways, parks, development
of power, and low-cost housing, seems sufficiently restricted as to its
expenditure by the executive branch. 2 ' The terms of thd act do not
approach the nebulousness of the Congressional delegation successfully
attacked in early New Deal cases, 2 2 but on the contrary seem to fall
" Since any action by the county is entirely voluntary on its part, the principal case should be distinguished from those cases in which the defendant maliciously, or through unlawful coercion induces a third party to exercise a legal
right resulting in damage to the plaintiff. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33,. 36 Sup.
Ct. 7, 60 L. ed. 131 (1915); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S.
229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. ed. 260 (1917) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251,
38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. ed. 349 (1920) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1070 (1924) ; United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732 (1921).
'I Missouri Public Service Co. v. Concordia, 8 F. Supp. I (W. D. Mo. 1934);
Washington Water Power Co. v. Coeur D'Alene, 9 F. Supp. 263 (D. Idaho 1934) ;
Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Centralia, 11 F. Supp. 874 (E. D. Ill. 1935);
Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Independence, 79 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
Accord: The Citizens' Electric Illuminating Co. v. The Lackawanna & Wyoming
Valley Power Co., 255 Pa. 145, 99 Atl. 462 (1916) (defendant power company
enjoined from selling power, in violation of its charter, etc., to third power company which had a legal right to compete with the plaintiff). Contra: Missouri
Utilities Co. v. California, 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D. Mo. 1934); Alleghan v. Consumers' Power Co., 71 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934); Arkansas-Missouri
Power Co. v. Kennett, 78 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes, 91 F. (2d) 303 (App. D. C. 1937) ; cf. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v.
Lamoni, 11 F. Supp. 581 (S. D. Iowa 1935) (administrator not a party defendant); Kansas Utilities. Co. v. Burlington, 141 Kan. 926, 44 P. (2d) 223 (1935)
(administrator not a party defendant).
'Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253 (U. S. 1825); see cases
cited infra note 23.
" 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §701 (1934).
" 48 STAT. 201, 202 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §§402, 403 (a) (1934).
From the practical necessities of the case, Congress should not have to prescribe minute details for the expenditure of the huge sums it appropriates. Recently, in Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 764, 81 L. ed. Adv.
Ops. 707 (1937), the Court confirmed the validitr of large general appropriations
to be allotted and expended as directed 'by designated government agencies.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 79 L. ed.
446 (1935) (President authorized, without any standard for guidance of discretion, to prohibit the foreign or interstate transportation of "hot" oil); A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 490, 55 Sup. Ct. 818, 79 L.
ed. 1566 (1935) (general aims of rehabilitation, correction, expansion laid down as
standards for executive promulgation of N. R. A. codes for business).
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safely within standards previously approved by the Court.23 Furthermore, since Congress may ratify acts which it might have authorized,2 4
if the standard laid down for administrative guidance was not sufficiently clear, the defect has been remedied by subsequent legislation
giving recognition and approval to the administrator's action and program.25

However, the major constitutional issue which the principal case
will probably serve to clarify is the extent of the power of the legislature to spend money under the general welfare clause. 2 l Discarding
its time-worn policy of evading a decision as to the proper interpretation of that clause,2 7 the Court in the A.A.A. case2 8 set the age-old con"Although the Court has in the past (before the Hot Oil case) seemed to require the legislature in making a valid delegation, merely to lay down some 'intelligible principle,' Hampton v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 308, 72 L. ed.
624 (1928), 'declared policy,' Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40, 44 Sup. Ct. 283.
68 L. ed. 564 (1924) or 'primary standard,' Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S.
470, 496, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. ed. 525 (1904) for the guidance of the executive,
many indefinite declarations of policy have been judicially approved. Thus in
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. ed. 537 (U. S. 1827) ; 'such number of the
militia.., as he may deem necessary'; in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup.
Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294 (1892) 'reciprocally unequal and unreasonable,' 'suspend... for such time as he shall deem just'; Buttfield v. Stranahan, Supra, 'Establish uniform standards of purity, quality and fitness'; Union Bridge Co. v.
U. S., 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 51 L. ed. 523 (1907) 'unreasonable obstruction of navigation'; U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. ed.
563 (1911) 'such rules ... as will insure the objects of such reservation'; United
States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 1, 71 L. ed. 131
(1926) 'in the public interest'; Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros., 289 U. S. 266.
3 Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L. ed. 1166, (1933) 'public convenience, interest or necessity.'" Cowan, Federal Spending Power and Delegation (1937) 5 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 809, 827, n. 69.

It would seem that the degree of definiteness required in an appropriation
measure should not be as great as that required in a regulatory measure to which
criminal penalties are attached, as in the Hot Oil and Schechter cases. See note
21, supra.
" Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687, 24 L. ed. 1098 (1878) ; Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 27 Sup. Ct. 233, 51 L. ed. 351 (1906); United States v.
Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 51 L. ed. 1098 (1907); Tiaco v. Forbes,
228 U. S. 549, 33 Sup. Ct. 585, 57 L. ed. 960 (1913) ; Charlotte Harbor & Northern Ry. v. Welles, 260 U. S. 8, 43 Sup. Ct. 3, 67 L. ed. 100 (1922) ; IsbrandtsenMoller Co., Inc. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct 407, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 344
(1937) ; Swayne & Holt, Ltd. v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 478, 81 L. ed. Adv.
Ops. 400 (1937).
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, 49 STAT. 115 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A.
§728 note (1936) (authorized continuance of functions of P. W. A.) Emergency
Relief Act, 49 STAT. 1608, 15 U. S. C. A. §728 note (1936) (further appropriation for projects of which administrator had previously approved; time limit
not to apply to projects which had been enjoined in the courts).
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States . . . ." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8.
'Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 28 L. ed. 798 (1884);
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294 (1892); United
States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, 16 Sup. Ct. 1120, 41 L. ed. 215 (1896) ; Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291, 20 Sup. Ct. 121, 44 L. ed. 168 (1899) ; Milliard v.
Roberts, 202 U. S. 429, 26 Sup. Ct. 674, 50 L. ed. 1090 (1906) ; Wilson -v.Shaw,
204 U. §. 24, 27 Sup. Ct. 233, 51 L. ed. 351 (1907) ; Smith v. Kansas City Title
Co., 255 U. S. 180. 41 Sup. Ct. 309, 65 L. ed. 594 (1921) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. ed. 1078 (1923).
"United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. 477 (1935).
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troversy 29 at rest by its adoption of the "Hamiltonian" view, i.e., that
the power of Congress to spend for the general welfare is limited only
by the requirement that the welfare be general, not particular. In
Helvering v. Davis ° the Court recognizes that "Spreading from state
to state, unemployment is an ill not particular but general, which may be
checked, if Congress so determines, by the resources of the nation."
Relief of unemployment being thus judicially approved as a valid objective of the exercise of the power to spend, the remaining question is
whether a nation-wide program of public works is a means reasonably
related to accomplishing that end. As public works construction has
long been used to aid economic distress caused by unemployment and
2
other factors,3 1 history, as well as the actual results of the P.W.A.,
justifies the legislative determination that public works are a reasonable
means. While the benefits arising from the use of each individual project are restricted to a local area, benefits from the construction of many
individual projects in a huge scheme are national in effect.8 3 As Mr.
Justice Stone said of payment of unemployment benefits in Carmichael
v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., "When public evils ensue from individual misfortunes or needs, the legislature may strike at the evil at its
source. If the purpose is legitimate because public, it will not be de'There are. three possible views of the meaning of the general welfare clause:
(1) that "to provide for the general Welfare" is a separate delegation of power
enabling Congress to legislate fully in that regard; (2) that the clause is a limitation on the taxing power, and Congress may spend only for the powers enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution; (3) that Congress, irrespective of other
enumerated powers, may spend for any welfare that is general in nature.
The first view has been discredited by construction, since the other delegation
of powers to Congress would have been superfluous. See I STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1905) §§909-10. The second
view was Madison's interpretation of the clause, and Hamilton urged the adoption of the third theory. See TucKER, THE CoNsTrTlON OF THE UNITED STATES
(1899) 470-501; Hamilton, Report on Manufacturers (1791), 4 WORKS OF HAII=ox
(Lodge ed. 1904) 70, 151; The General Welfare Clause:n The Hamilton
and Madison Views (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 115. Congress, of course, has appropriated for many years in the light of the Hamiltonian interpretation, which has
been accepted 'by most modern authorities. See McGuire, The New Deal and the
Public Money (1935) 23 Gmo. L. J. 155; Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 548; Collier, Judicial Bootstraps and the General
Welfare Clause (1936) 4 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 211; Perkins, The Power of
Congress to Lay Taxes for Distribution to the States (1934) 12 N. C. L. REV.
326; Note (1937) 50 H.,iv. L. REv. 802; (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 667.
' 57 Sup. Ct. 904, 909, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 804, 808 (1937).
'19 & 10 Vicr. c. 107 (1846) ; 5 EDW. VII, c. 18 (1905) ; 9 EDw. VII, c. 47
(1909); 46 STAT. 1086 (1931), 29 U. S. C. A. §48 (d) (1936).
1 "In 1934 the average monthly direct employment on PWA projects was
496,483; in 1935 it was 284,287. See PWA, THE FIRST THREE YEARS (1936) 24.
Up to Aug. 1, 1936, $2,521,769,475 had been spent, and of this, $826,943,588 went
directly to wages. See id. at 26. Of the $1,452,278,296 which went to materials,
60% went into wages. See ibid. The indirect employment created is three times
the direct employment. See id. at 27." Note (1937) 50 HAv. L. REV. 802, 811 n.
83.
' See note 32, supra.
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feated because the execution of it involves payments to individuals. 3' 4
The general welfare consists, then, of many particular welfares, and a
national scheme of public works improvements fully satisfies the requirement of generality.
However, in the A.A.A. case the Court imposed on the spending
power a limitation which proponents of the Hamiltonian view had
never thought to exist. Without deciding whether agricultural payments for crop reduction were in aid of general welfare, the Court
declared the statute unconstitutional because the conditions imposed
on the recipient of the federal grant sought to regulate a matter
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. To sustain such
an attack on the statute here involved, there would apparently have to
be a finding that the primary purpose of the act was not relief of un35
employment, but federal regulation of a matter reserved to the states.
Since the state (or its subdivision) has its option of applying for
P.W.A. loans and grants, under previous authority3 6 there is no abdication or invasion of state powers. Economic pressure, which was said
37
to preclude a free choice by the individual farmer under the A.A.A.,
would hardly be held by the Court to be exerted on a sovereign state that
suffers no competition. 38 Moreover, the conditions here imposed on
the recipient of P.W.A. money relate to the expenditure of the money
(in order to secure the greatest possible reduction of unemployment
for the money used) ,3 9 rather than to conduct unrelated thereto as in
the A.A.A. case. While scant reliance can be placed on the declared
judicial policy of refusing to look beyond the face of an act for regulatory effects, 40 the incidental "regulation by competition" of local
"57 Sup. Ct. 868, 876, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 811, 821 (1937).

= Such a finding would be difficult in the face of existing facts. Of 9,389 nonfederal projects of the P.W.A. on: January 1, 1937, only 282 were power projects.
Of the 282 only 92 were competing with private companies. While over $27,000,000
were allotted to the competitive projects, this amount was only .98% of the total
allotments to non-federal projects. Brief for Respondents, p. 17.
" See cases cited infra note 38.

' United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 70, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 321, 80 L. ed. 477,
491 (1935).
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 480, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 598. 67
L. ed. 1078, 1082 (1923) ; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct 883, 890,
81 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 779, 787 (1937).
"Conditions under which P.W.A. spending is carried on are: (1) no convict
labor be used; (2) a maximum of human labor be used; (3) working hours be
limited; (4) a just wage be paid; (5) preference be given veterans seeking em-

ployment. With the possible exception of the fifth, all the conditions are clearly

related to furthering the reduction of unemployment. See Hale, Unconstitutiolwl
Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 321; (1936) 36
CoL. L. Rzv. 667; (1936) 31 ILL. L. REv. 259.
" McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78 (1904)
(Oleomargarine Tax Act) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct.
214, 63 L. ed. 493 (1919) (Narcotic Act) ; Sonzinsky v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct.
554, 81 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 556 (1937) (National Firearms Act).
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utility rates by making it financially possible for the county to compete
can scarcely be deemed an invasion of state power, since the state
retains control of the electric rates of both the power company and
the county.
The most substantial ground of the plaintiff's complaint is, in effect,
that the administrator has exceeded his statutory authority in the administration of the P.W.A. power program. It was found as a fact
that, at the time the application for a loan and grant was approved and
the original contract signed, the primary criterion applied to applications for loans to power plants was whether by granting the loans a
reduction in existing rates would be effected. 4 ' If the privately owned
power company would lower its rates to meet the proposed municipal
or county rate, the application was denied. 42 As the act declares its
purpose to be relief of unemployment, the approval or denial of applications on the basis of such a "non-statutory" criterion would seem to
be lacking in statutory authority,43 rather than to be the exercise of
administrative discretion behind which the courts will not inquire to
ascertain the official's motive. 4 4 However, the policy practiced by the
P.W.A. purportedly underwent quite a renovation. The trial court
found the fact that, as to making the second contract and allotting funds
to Greenwood County, the administrator was actuated by no other
purpose or policy than that set out in the act of Congress, and that his
only interest in the rates charged by the plaintiff was that of a prospective bondholder of a competitor of the plaintiff.45 In the light of
such a finding, the administrator's action appears justified under the
authority conferred on him by a constitutional statute. One cannot
but feel, however, as does Judge Soper (dissenting), that the purported change from the former policy of rate reduction by the administrator amounted to "little more than an expression of regret that what
had been widely proclaimed as a praiseworthy public policy had become
a source of danger to the establishment of municipal projects", 40 and
41

Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 19 F. Supp. 932, 946 (W. D. S. C.

1937).
,Old. at 938.
' 3 Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462 (App. D. C. 1928); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190, 77 L. ed. 375 (1932) ; Southern

Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 31 Sup. Ct. 288,
55 L. ed. 283 (1911) ; Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250, 46 Sup. Ct. 92, 70 L. ed.

258 (1925); St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup.

Ct 384, 73 L. ed. 798 (1928) ; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 190 Fed. 591 (Commerce Ct. 1911).

"Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L. ed. 537 (U. S. 1827) ; Dakota Central

Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 39 Sup. Ct. 507, 63 L. ed. 910

(1919); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 34 Sup. Ct. 938, 58 L. ed. 1506
(1913); Ferris v. Wilbur, 27 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
"Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 91 F. (2d) 665, 671 (C. C. A. 4th,

1937).

" Id. at 679.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
that the omission of rate control by the administrator in the second
47
contract was a change merely in form to meet legal objections.
C. A. GRIFFiN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Regulating Closing Hours of Business.
An ordinance, avowedly "in the interest of the public health, safety
and welfare",' fixed the hours of business of barber shops. Bills in
equity brought by four separate plaintiffs to enjoin the city from enforcing the ordinance, were heard together and dismissed, the court
saying that if a regulation has "a reasonable relation to the protection
of public health, safety or welfare" the court may not hold it invalid
merely because the court believes it to be unwise. The ordinance was
deemed valid because not proved unreasonable or arbitrary. 2
As early as 1773, the New York Colonial Assembly passed an act
forbidding the auctioning of goods after sunset.3 Since then, numerous closing-hour ordinances have been applied to various businesses and
occupations. Those passed upon by courts of final jurisdiction may
be classified rather arbitrarily into six groups, based on subjects regulated.
I. Ordinances forbidding auction sales of jewelry at night have
generally been held valid as being not unreasonable or arbitrary. 4 The
Virginia court held that the purpose for which such an ordinance was
passed could be shown to prove its validity, but not to prove its invalidity.5 The prevention of fraud is most often the expressed purpose,
as it was in this case. The Georgia court, admitting that such an ordinance had been lobbied through by regular jewelers to destroy competition, said, in effect, "Even so"--and held the possibility of fraud made
the ordinance a reasonable exercise of a municipality's police power. 6
II. Ordinances fixing hours of business for pawnbrokers, loan
offices, junk dealers, etc., have been held valid in two cases. One court
frankly approved the ordinance's purpose of depriving thieves of the
opportunity to sell stolen goods at night,7 while the other, after talking
'The United States Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision Monday,
Jan. 3, 1938, that no legal right of the plaintiff was violated by construction of the
county plant and that plaintiff was without standing to challenge the validity of

the administrator's act.
:'CINCINNATI, OHIO CODE OF ORDINANcEs No. 306-1936.

'Feldman v. City of Cincinnati et at., 20 F. Supp. 531, 536 (S. D. Ohio 1937).
' Acts of Colonial Assembly of New York, c. 1615 (1773).
' Clein et at. v. City of Atlanta et al., 164 Ga. 529, 139 S. E. 46 (1927) ; Wag-

man v. City of Trenton et al., 102 N. J. L. 492, 134 Atl. 115 (1926); Biddles,
Inc., et al. v. Enright, 239 N. 'Y. 354, 146 N. E. 625, 39 A. L. R. 773 (1925);
Miller et at. v. City of Greenville et al., 134 S. C. 314, 132 S. E. 591 (1926);
City of Roanoke v. Fisher, 137 Va. 75, 119 S. E. 259 (1923).
5City of Roanoke v. Fisher, 137 Va. 75, 119 S. E. 259 (1923).
'Clein et al. v. City of Atlanta et al., 164 Ga. 529, 139 S. E. 46 (1927).
' Hyman v. Boldrich, 153 Ky. 77, 154 S. W. 369 (1913).
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about various evils existing in pawn shops, etc., presumed that the city
council had reasonable grounds for enacting the ordinance.8
III. "Liquor saloons and pool rooms, slot machines, and other things
of that character" is a category from a Florida opinion which upholds
an ordinance 9 regulating hours of operation of slot machines. In 1904,
North Carolina held that hours during which liquor might be sold in a
barroom might be regulated, since liquor traffic is dangerous to society
in its moral effects. The court also said the ordinance was not an
unreasonable restriction on the use of barroom property. 10 Ordinances
have been sustained which close pool and billiard rooms after seven"
in the evening (the court assumed, without discussion, that the ordinance was reasonable); after nine12 (the court said it could not find
the ordinance unreasonable, since billiard halls were "vicious in their
tendencies", and hence more subject to regulation than more desirable
businesses) ; or after midnight' 3 (the court said that the ordinance was
reasonable because pool rooms were ordered closed during the hours
when lawless persons would tend to congregate in them). But where
complainant's customers worked during the day, an ordinance closing
pool rooms at 6 :0 P.M. was held invalid as conflicting with a state
license permitting him to operate a pool room. 14 Florida called the
maintenance of a slot machine "a business which may only be operated
because of the permissive statute," and decided that it, together with,
pool and billiard rooms, was a fit subject for regulation, because it
tended to have a harmful effect on society.' 5
IV. The courts are divided on the subject of closing hours for
mercantile businesses. In 1873, Kentucky sustained as reasonable an
ordinance fixing market hours from dawn till 8:00 or 9:00 A.M.,
depending on the season of the year.' 6 Twenty years later, Mississippi
sustained an ordinance closing at 4:00 P.M. the meat markets of those
not having city permits"1 Over thirty years later California held valid
two ordinances preventing the sale of uncured or uncooked meats during the hours when the inspectors were not on duty, the ordinance
being deemed reasonably related to wholesome condition of meat.' 8
8 City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 75 Pac. 521 (1904).
'Curtis v. Hutchingson, 125 Fla. 440, 170 So. 135, 136 (1936).
"Paul v. Washington, 134 N. C. 363, 47 S. E. 793 (1904).
"Purvis v. City of Ocilla et al., 149 Ga. 771, 102 S. E. 241 (1920).
12 City

of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 25 S. W. 202, 203 (1894).

" Ex parle Brewer, 68 Tex. Cr. 387, 152 S. W. 1068 (1913) ; Ex parle Pitchios,
68 Tex. Cr. 376, 152 S.W. 1074 (1913).
"Craig et al. v. Mayor and Alderman of Town of Gallatin, 168 Tenn. 413,
79 S.W. (2d) 553 (1935).
'Curtis v. Hutchingson, 125 Fla. 440, 170 So. 135 (1936); Curtis v. Hutchingson, 125 Fla. 440, 170 So. 136 (1936).
. City of Bowling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush 64 (Ky. 1873).

2'Porter v. City of Water Valley, 70 Miss. 560, 12 So. 828 (1893).
"-'Ex parle Lowenthal, 92 Cal. App. 200, 267 Pac, 886 (1928); Ex parle
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That section of an ordinance which provided that all meat markets
must close at 6:00 P.M. was held invalid in Washington on the ground
that the regulation had no reasonable relation to its accepted purpose,
which was to prevent the smuggling of meat after dark.' 9 The court
expressly refused to say that no closing hours could be set up in the
meat selling business. 20 In the same vein, Ohio in 1937 held that an
ordinance closing food stores at 7:30 P.M. on five days a week went
too far. The court found that the inspection laws insured the purity
of foods, and said that if the people desired regulations like the ordinance in question, they would have to amend the federal and state
21
constitutions.
In 1902, the North Carolina court passed on an ordinance closing
barrooms and mercantile establishments (drug stores excepted), at
7:30 P.M. during the summer months. Construing the legislative grant
of power strictly, the court held that letting the city pass such an ordinance would be giving it equal power with the legislature to restrict
personal and property rights. But the court expressly refused to decide
the validity of a legislative enactment that would fix closing hours. It
is perhaps noteworthy that the defendant in the case was the owner not
22
of a barroom, but of a grocery store.
An ordinance prohibiting the delivery of bakers' goods between
6:00 P.M. and 6:30 A.M. was held invalid as an unreasonable interference with the carrying on of a lawful business, and because it had
no reasonable relation to its supposed purpose of keeping the goods
clean.23 An ordinance prohibiting the hawking of newspapers between
9:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. was held invalid as discriminating in favor
24
of news stands.
V. Several cases involving the validity of ordinances regulating
hours of business for laundries have arisen in California. In 1884,
the court held that in restricted areas of San Francisco the operation of
public laundries might be prohibited after 10:00 P.M. and before
6:00 A.M. The court cited no authorities, but held that it could not
say "it is not necessary, for the proper police and sanitary conditions
of the city" (to establish the closing hours).25 The next year the
Hennessy, 95 Cal. App. 762, 273 Pac. 826 (1928) ; Accord: Justesen's Food Stores,
Inc., v. City of Tulare et at.,
70 P. (2d) 529 (Cal. 1937). But cf. Deese et at. v.
City of Lodi et al., 69 P. (2d) 1005 (Cal. 1937) (Ordinance closed grocery stores,
meat and fruit markets, etc., but expressly excepted pool, billiard and dance halls.).
Brown v. City of Seattle et al., 150 Wash. 203, 272 Pac. 517 (1928).
Id., 272 Pac. at 522.
Olds v. Klotz, 131-Ohio St. 447, 3 N. E. (2d) 371 (1936).
22State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 42 S.E. 960, 60 L. R. A. 634 (1902).
Skaggs et al. v. City of Oakland et al., 6 Cal. (2d) 222, 57 P. (2d) 47?
(1936):
People v. Kuc, 272 N. Y. 72, 4 N. E. (2d) 939 (1936). E3x parte Moynier, 65 Cal. 34, 36, 2 Pac. 728, 730 (1884).
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United States Supreme Court sustained a similar ordinance. The
Court, pointing to the many wooden buildings to be endangered by the
constant fires necessary in laundries, held that such an ordinance might
well be necessary. 26 The same Court refused in another case to recog-

nize the argument that such an ordinance had been passed to discrimi27

nate against the Chinese.
By 1914, the closing hour for laundries in San Francisco had become
6:00 P.M., and had been applied to the entire city. Justifying the
earlier closing hour, the California court held a fair measure to be the
"usual period of business activity in similar sorts of employment. ' 28
VI. And, finally, thirteen decisions involving closing hours of barber
shops have been handed down in fifteen years. Ten states29 held that
such ordinances were invalid as being arbitrary and unreasonable, and
left the barber "free to work out his destiny as impulse, education,"
etc., 80 might direct, insofar as his destiny was affected by week-day
closing hours. Other arguments advanced by the various courts included that of unfair discrimination against barbers. 31 One court said
that isolated instances of liquor and narcotic law violations in barber
shops after dark afforded no grounds for regulation of hours ;82 others,
that regulation of closing hours had no reasonable relation to the prevention of unsanitary barber shops ;33 still another, that an ordinance
'Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. ed. 923 (1885).
'Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. ed. 1145 (1885).
' Ex parte Wong Wing, 167 Cal. 109, 111, 138 Pac. 695, 696 (1914) ; Contra:
Yee Gee v. City and County of San Francisco et at., 235 Fed. 757 -(N. D. Cal.
1916) (The court held the danger of fires not to exist over the whole city, laundries not to be in and of themselves offensive or dangerous, and so much of thq
ordinance as fixed closing hours, invalid; Ex parte Mark, 6 Cal. (2d) 516, 58 P.
(2d) 913 (1936) (An ordinance forbidding also the soliciting, delivering, etc., of
laundry at night, was held toAbe a regulation of hours of labor, and as such was
considered invalid by the California court, as depriving employees of liberty without due process.).
Ganley v. Claeys et al., 2 Cal. (2d) 266, 40 P. (2d) 817 (1935) ; City and
County of Denver v. Schmid, 98 Colo. 32, 52 P. (2d) 388 (1935); Chaires v.
Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 139 S. E. 559, 55 A. L. R. 242 (1927) ; City of Alexandria
v. Hall, 171 La. 595, 131 So. 722 (1930); Eanes et al. v. City of Detroit et at.,
279 Mich. 531, 272 N. W. 896 (1937); State ex rel. Pavlich v. Johannes, 194
Minn. 10, 259 N. W. 537. (1935); Knight v. Johns, 161 Miss. 519, 137 So. 509
(1931) ; Ernesti et al. v. City of Grand Island et al., 125 Neb. 688, 251 N. W.
899 (1933) ; Patton v. City of Bellingham et al., 179 Wash. 566, 38 P. (2d) 364
(1934); State ex rel. Newman v. City of Laramie et al., 40 Wyo. 64, 275 Pac.
106 (1929).
Ex parte jentysch, 112 Cal. 468, 44 Pac. 803, 804 (1896).
City and County of Denver v. Schmid, 98 Colo. 32, 52 P. (2d) 388 (1935)
Chaires v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 139 S.E. 559, 55 A. L. R. 242 (1927); Ernesti
et al. v. City of Grand Island et at., 125 Neb. 688, 251 N. W. 899 (1933); Patton
v. City of Bellingham et al., 179 Wash. 566, 38 P. (2d) 364 (1934) ; State ex rel.
Newman v. City of Laramie et al., 40 Wyo. 64, 275 Pac. 106 (1929).
Chaires-v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 139 S. E. 559, 55 A. L. R. 242 (1927).
Ganley v. Claeys et at., 2 Cal. (2d) 266, 40 P. (2d) 817 (1935) ; City of
Alexandria v. Hall, 171 La. 595, 131 So. 722 (1930); State ex rel. Pavlich v.
Johannes, 194 Minn. 10, 259 N. W. 537 (1935); Ernesti et al. v. City of Grand
Island et al., 125 Neb. 688, 251 N. W. 899 (1933) ; State ex rel Newman v. City
of Laramie et al., 40 Wyo. 64, 275 Pac. 106 (1929).
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was invalid because, among other reasons, it was not an hours of labor
measure and discriminated in favor of beauty parlors.3 4 Several courts
said the hours during which barber shops might remain open could not
be regulated merely to suit the convenience of inspectors.3 5
In three cases, in addition to the principal case, ordinances regulating closing hours of barber shops have been held valid. The earliest
of these arose in New Jersey, where the court was influenced in its
decision by the fact that the ordinance was passed pursuant to a state
statute specifically authorizing cities to regulate hours in barber shops 3 6
The Ohio Court, citing eight cases against the validity of closing hour
ordinances, relied on dissenting opinions, the New Jersey case, and a
constitutional grant of power to municipalities to pass ordinances not
in conflict with general laws. To find the ordinance not in conflict
with general laws, the court looked at the state laws relating to barbers,
found no mention of closing hours, and held that field not to have been
preEmpted by the legislature. The Ohio Court said further that fixing
closing hours might "be to the legislative mind the only effective way
to regulate hours of labor37 in this trade. 3 8s The one- or two-man barber shop might compete with the two- or three-shift shop without
having to stay open long hours. But a United States District Court,
in a case arising in Washington, held that complainant had a property
right in the good will he had built up by operating his small barber
shop until 11:00 P.M. for twenty-five years. So while the court found
the closing hour ordinance valid as not being unduly discriminatory
merely because it did not close beauty parlors, the court found the ordi39
nance invalid as applied to complainant.
It is difficult to formulate any rules from the preceding cases. Very
generally, however, it may be said that an ordinance regulating hours
of business will be held valid unless it is shown that: 1. The ordinance
has no reasonable relation to the end sought to be accomplished; or
2. a constitutional right has been infringed; or 3. the nature of the
business does not render it a fit subject for regulation.
VIRGINiA A. DOUGLAS.

"City and County of Denver v. Schmid, 98 Colo. 32, 52 P. (2d) 388, (1935).
'Ibid.; Knight v. Johns, 161 Miss. 519, 137 So. 509 (1931) ; Ernesti et al. v.
City of Grand Island et a[., 125 Neb. 688, 251 N. W. 899 (1933).
" Falco v. 'Atlantic City et aL., 99 N. J. L. 19, 122 Atl. 610 (1923).
' See (1933) 12 N. C. L. Rv. 156 for discussion of hours of labor legislation.
' Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 294, 199 N. E. 187, 191
(1935), affrg City of Zanesville v. Wilson, 51 Ohio App. 433, 1 N. E. (2d) 638
(1935).
McDermott v. City of Seattle et al., 4 Fed. Supp. 855 (W. D. Wash. 1933).
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Criminal Law-Embezzlement.
Defendant, a bank receiver, was indicted for embezzlement. The
indictment was quashed. Held, judgment affirmed. Receivers of insolvent corporations do not come within the purview of the embezzlement statute.1
Embezzlement was not a crime at common law.2 The first statute
to make embezzlement a crime concerned the embezzlement of court
records and documents and was enacted in 1429.3 One hundred years
later, in 1529, the statute of 21 Hen. VIII, c. 7-the "granddaddy" of
all modern embezzlement statutes-made it felonious for a servant to
embezzle money or chattels entrusted to him by his master. It soon
became apparent, however, that servants and persons in possession of
court records were not the only ones occupying such a position that a
misappropriation of goods belonging to another would not amount to
larceny, and Parliament began the long and tedious process of extending the law in order to include these persons. At first Parliament
contented itself with-the enactment of a few disconnected statutes which
added lodgers, 4 post office servants,5 and servants of the Bank of
England. 6 The first general embezzlement statute, extending the law
to cover "any servant or clerk, or any person employed for the purpose in the capacity of servant or clerk, to any person or persons whatsoever, or to any body corporate or politick", was not passed until as
late as 1799. 7 Since then the additions have come rapidly. Certain
bankers were added in 1826.8 A second general statute, passed in
1827, which re-enacted the Larceny Act9 of that year, named "any
Banker, Merchant, Broker, Attorney, or other Agent", tenants and
lodgers, and persons taking shipwrecked goods.10 During the next
thirty years, members of joint stock banks, 1 persons entrusted with
woolen, worsted, linen, cotton, mohair, flax or silk materials for the
purpose of manufacture, and with tools or apparatus for such manufacture,12 and collectors of poor rates under the provisions of the Poor
Law 3 were added at various times. A third general statute, passed in
1857, included trustees acting under express trust, persons acting under
powers of attorney for the sale or transfer of property, bailees, and
directors, managers or public officers of any body corporate or public
company.' 4 This latter statute was re-enacted by the Larceny Act
1State

v. Whitehurst, 212 N. C. 300 (1937).
§116.

MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1934)

'3 & 4 WILL. & MARY C. 9 (1691).
'8 HEN. VI, c. 12.
'9 ANNE C. 10 (1710), 5 GEO. III, c. 25 (1765), 7 GEO. III, c. 50 (1766).
'15 GED. II, c. 13 (1742).
739 Go. III, c. 85.
'7 Gm. IV, c. 46, §9.
'7 & 8 GEo. IV, c. 27.
2 7 & 8 GEO. IV, c. 29, §§ 18, 19, 45, 49.

u3 & 4 Vicr. c. 111, §2 (1840).

13 VIcr.
Virc. c.c. 54,
103,§§§15
12 &
1, 3,(1849).
4, 5, 17.
2'20
&21

"6 & 7 Vicr. c. 40 (1843).
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of 1861, which, in addition, named persons in the Queen's service and
in the police, factors, and officers of the Bank of England. 15 Since
then, at various times, the following persons have been added: officers
of savings banks ;16 persons in possession of naval stores ;17 members
of copartnerships "or being one of two or more beneficial owners" ;18
officers and members of trades unions ;19 any person connected with a
building society ;20 officers, clerks, or other persons in the customs service ;21 army officers and soldiers (public or regimental money or property, or property or money belonging to comrades) ;22 any person coming into the possession of the property of any industrial society ;23
seamen or apprentices to the sea service, or any officer appointed by a
local marine board ;24 persons fraudulently converting property belonging to any Friendly Society ;25 and members of the Army and Air
Force. 28 In 1901 Parliament enacted a very broad statute making it
felonious for "whosoever being entrusted . . . with . . . any property,
27
or having . . . received any property" to embezzle such property,
which apparently extends the law to all persons who may be in a
position fraudulently to convert property belonging to another. Obviously, then, the English law of embezzlement, as it stands today, is
the result of a continuous process of enacting, re-enacting and amending the statutes ir order to extend the law so as to include within its
scope novel and unforeseen situations as they arise.
The history of the law of embezzlement in North Carolina closely
parallels that of England. North Carolina, when it ceased to be a colony
and became a state, retained on its books those English statutes which
made embezzlement by servants 28 and by persons in possession of court
records and documents2 9 criminal offenses.80 The inadequacy of the
law became apparent at a very early date, for, in 1792, the members
of the court differed on the question of whether or not a merchant's
clerk came within the statute applying to servants. 3 ' This particular
defect, however, was not remedied until eighty years later, although,
N24 & 25 Vicr. c. 96, §§ 70, 73, 78.
" 26 & 27 Vicr. c. 87, §9 (1863).
'29 & 30 Vicr. c. 109, §33 (1866).
1831 & 32 Vicr. c. 116 (1868).
"34 & 35 Vici'. c. 31, §12 (1871).
'37 & 38 Vicr. c. 42, §31 (1874).
'39 & 40 Vicr. c. 36, §29 (1876).
'44 & 45 VicT. c. 58, §§ 17, 18 (1881).
=56 & 57 Vicr. c. 39, §64 (1893).
57 & 58 Vicr. c. 60, §§ 225(1) (f), 248 (1894).
59 & 60 Vicr. c. 25, §87 (1896), 8 EDW. VII, c. 32, §9 (1908).
"22 & 23 GEo. V, c. 22, §§ 9, 14, schs. 2, 3 (1932).

=1

"21

EDW. VII, c. 10.
HEN. VIII, c. 7

(1529).

"8

HEN.

VI, c. 12 (1429).

' MARTIN, COLLECTION OF THE STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN

1792 (1792) 130, 188.
' State v. Higgins, 1 N. C. 36. For other decisions construing the term "servant," see State v. Costin, 89 N. C. 511 (1883); State v. Lanier, 89 N. C. 517
(183).
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during the interim, statutes covering shipwrecked goods8 2 and public
arms8 3 were enacted. The Legislature of 1871-72 realized the necessity of extending the law and passed what is today referred to as "the
embezzlement statute", which covered "any officer, agent, clerk, em3 4
ployee, or servant of any corporation, person or copartnership"
Since then the statute has been amended a number of times: in 1889,
"consignee" was inserted ;35 in 1891, as a result of the decision in State
v. Connelly,86 in which the court ruled that a clerk of the superior
court was not included within the terms of the statute, the words
"public officer, clerk of the superior or other court, sheriff, or other
person exercising a public trust or holding a public office" were added ;,"
in 1897, guardians, administrators, and executors were brought within
the scope of the statute ;38 and finally, in 1931, the statute was further
extended to include trustees.3 9
The General Assembly did not, however, confine itself to the
enacting and amending of one statute. During the '70s other acts
were passed covering the following persons: "any officer, agent or
employee of the state, or other person having or holding in trust for
the same . . . ";40 "any officer, agent or employee of any city, county,
or incorporated town, or of any penal, charitable, religious or educational institution", or any person holding property in trust for such
institution ;41 "any treasurer or other financial officer of any benevolent
or religious institution, society or congregation" ;42 "any president,
,secretary, treasurer, director, engineer, agent, or other officer of any
railroad company", or any person conspiring with such president,
director, etc.;43 and officers collecting certain taxes and fines for the
state.4 4 The Legislature of 1883 added "any officer appropriating to his
own use the state, county, school, city or town taxes". 45 At the turn
of the century, the General Assembly again directed its attention to the
law of embezzlement, enacting additional statutes covering insurance
agents, 40 surviving partners, 41 and "any president, director, cashier,
N. C. Laws 1801, c. 599, §6.

'N. C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, c. 145, §1.
N. C. Laws 1889, c. 226.
104 N. C. 794, 10 S. E. 469 (1889).
N. C. Laws 1891, c. 188.
IN. C. Laws 1931, c. 158.

"N. C. Laws 1876-77, c. 47.

I N. C. Laws 1831, c. 45, §5.
TM

N. C. Pub. Laws 1897, c. 31.
1 N. C. Laws 1874-75, c. 52.

IN. C. Laws 1879, c. 105. According to State v. Dunn, 134 N. C. 663, 46 S. E.
949 (1904) treasurers of mutual benefit societies do not fall within this statute.
IN. C. Pub. Laws 1870-71, c. 103, §§1, 2.
"N. C. Laws 1872-73, c. 144, sch. 6, §§6, 7 as amended by N. C. Pub. Laws
1883, c. 136, §48.
N. C. Pub. Laws 1883, c. 136, §49.
"N. C. Pub. Laws 1899, c. 54, §115 as amended by N. C. Pub. Laws 1911, c.
196, §8.
'uN.
C. Pub. Laws 1901, c. 640, §9.
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teller, clerk or agent of any bank or other corporation." 48 Finally, in
1921, possibly as a result of a Supreme Court decision approving an
instruction in the case of State v.Blackley 49 to the effect that if the
jury should find that the defendant was a partner, rather than an
agent, he could not be convicted under the existing statutes, an act
adding "any person engaged in a partnership business" was passed."
The situation presented by the instant case, then, is one which has
occurred before. The problem is now one for the legislature, and, as
Chief Justice Stacy suggests, "what the General Assembly has written
' N. C. Pub. Laws 1903, c. 275, §15 as amended by N. C. Pub. Laws 1921. c. 4,

§83 and N. C. Pub. Laws 1927, c. 47, §16.
'p138 N. C. 620, 50 S. E. 310 (1905).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1921, c. 127.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF EMBEZZLEMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA

Stat.

§ 19 § 33(e§.9
(1837)eacted acted
in

in

§11

§

1801)1831)
1

Code

(1855)
c.120, c.92,
Battles c.32, c.32,
§33
Revisal § 16
9en(1873)

c.32,
136

§11 §3

acted
1871(872)

Revisal
11611

7

(1883)

106 i017 I11

01

• en acted acted acted cted d

acted 1889, 187 1876) 1879) 187 187
1883)1891, 1875)
1871) 1871)
1897S)
Rev.

13499 3508

Codeen-

§3542§341 §3406 §340713408 139 3403§3

(1905)

."

1891)

13489

§3325
13405

ten- (en-

acted acted acted
1899) 1901)1903)

Peli's
13499§3508
Revisal
(1908)

1354213410§3406 §340

Consol.
§4253 §4255
Seat.

§68 54276 §4268 §4269 4270 §427114272 4273 §4274 §4275 4401

2408 §340913403§3404 3489d§4
1340513325
32
1911)

(1919)

Comol.

Stat.
(Michie,
1935)

1921,
1927)

14253 §4255

§688

427 p4268 1426 §4270 §42711427214273 14274 1427514401
.mo=d.

ed
1933)

4274(a)

1224(e)
en-

acted
1921)
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it has written, and if it be not satisfied with its writing, it can write
again."' '
Obviously the statute should be amended so as to include
receivers within its scope, but it is suggested that, instead of merely
adding receivers, the next enactment be framed to prevent, by the use
of all inclusive language, the arising of other specific instances of misappropriation of money or property not covered by the terms of the
statute.
An examination of the embezzlement statutes of the other fortyseven states reveals that these states have apparently gone through the
same process of extending their statutes as have England and North
Carolina; most of them, like our own state, having started out with
laws based upon the early English statutes. 52 In general, the various
states may be divided into three classifications, according to their
statutes. Into the first class fall those states 53 which are content with
simply naming a number of specific persons.54 The second group,
which is by far the largest numerically, is comprised of those states
having statutes which, in addition to naming specific persons, contain
general phrases covering all other persons of the type specifically named,
i.e., "other bailee", "other person acting in a fiduciary capacity",
"other person transporting goods for hire", "other person officially
connected with the court", "other person employed in such capacity",
"other person upon whom such trust has devolved", "other person
connected with a building and loan association", etc. 50 Into the third
'I State v. Whitehurst, 212 N. C. 300, 305 (1937).
12 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §324.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§190, 5124,
5 MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
6014.124, 6014.128, 10124, 11318, 11368, 11416.1, 11382; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930)
§§14-325, 14-326, 14-327, 14-332, 14-333, 22-1503, 67-602; ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp.
1935) §§14-348a, 25-311; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) §§6073, 6074; WAsH. REv. STAT.
ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§2569, 2571, 2601, 4226, 4227, 7091; WIS. STAT. (1931)

§§221.39, 289.02, 312.05, 343.20.
"'Persons named in other states that are not specificially mentioned in the
North Carolina statutes: broker, factor, assignee, bailee, common carrier, judge,
coroner, stockholder, warehouseman, wharfinger, wagoner, contractor (funds for
purpose of paying labor and materialmen and not used for that purpose), storage,
forwarding and commission merchant, master in chancery, commissioner, conservator. officer or member of any fraternal beneficiary society or other voluntary
association, solicitor, mortgagor using proceeds of a loan negotiated for improving
real property for other purposes, lodger, tenant, lessee, officers and employees of
building and loan associations, auctioneer, lessee of personal property, one in
possession of property under a contract to purchase, attorney in fact, innkeep2r,
consignor, lessee of a motor vehicle, porter, tutor, mandatary, depositary, curator,
member of joint stock company, trade union members and officers, member of cooperative association, receiver, lessor, person to whom clothes or other property
has -been furnished for personal use or for use in trade or business, perion removing property from a burning building and not returning it to the rightful
owner, mortgagee of personal property, bank or trust company official who receives a deposit when he knows at the time that the institution is insolvent, landlord, person to whom materials have been delivered for manufacture.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §§3355 (7), 3960-3973, 5405; ALA. CODE
'ALA.
ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1936) §§7111 (37), 3973, 3963 (1); ARM. Rrv. CODE ANN.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §§4764-4769, 4734; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,

NOTES AND COMMENTS
and final class fall those states which have, in many instances in addition
to statutes of the foregoing types, very broad statutes covering all persons who have legitimately come into possession of property belonging
to another, apparently intended to serve as catch-alls for just such
situations as that presented by the instant case.56 The construction
1921) §§2498-2507, 5062-3, 2832, 9497, 9709; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931)
§§424, 484, 490a, 503-514; CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, Supp. 1933) p. 333, §506b;

CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1935) p. 147, §484, Act 3748, §1730, Act 5132,
§§220-2; CoW. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 48, §§98-103, 151, c. 18, §§25, 105, c.

25, §91, c. 67, §2, c. 117, §14, c. 161, §31, c. 176, §§107, 242; CONN. GEN. STAT.
(1930) §§6364-6367, 6372-74, 6388, 6112, 3555; CONN. G ,N. STAT. (Supp. 1935)
§1717c; DEL. Rsv. CODE (1936) §§5209-5252; FLA. COmP. GEN. LAWS ANN.
(Skillman, 1927) §§1341, 5560(4), 7244-7257, 7456, 7492; FLA. COmp. GEN. LAWS
ANN. (Skillman, Supp. 1936) §§7251, 7254, 7257(1) ; GA. CODE (1933) §§13-9920,
26-2801 to 26-2811, 2901, 2902, 89-9903; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§15-1848, 173601-17-3607, 25-608, 25-1101, 25-1104, 30-2602, 40-904; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill,
1933) c. 21, 17, c. 38, 138, 39, 186-196, 390, c. 105, 148, 60; Ill. Laws 1937, c.
484; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933)" §§6-2101, 6-610, 10-1701-10-1717, 10-3013,
45-1012, 47-1519, 49-1814; Ind. Acts 1935, c. 233, §1; IowA CODE (1935) §§9221,
9304, 9388, 9401, 4753-a18, 13027-13037; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935)
§§21-545 to 21-548, 9-140, 17-1020, 17-2014, 17-10a02, 19-529, 22-1301 to 22-1305,
75-616, 75-617, 79-2201, 79-2202; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) §§717, 12021207, 1358a, 2747; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§678-681, 744.43, 744.42,
583; LA. CODE Calm. PRoc. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§779, 912-918; MAINE REV. STAT.
(1930) c. 48, §5, c. 57, §47, c. 77, §70, c. 80, §34, c. 131, §§8, 10; MD. ANN. CODE
(Bagby, 1924) art. 27, §§126-137; MIcH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §§340, 364, 365,
687, 850, 1877, 4649, 4749, 4917, 11963, 12037, 12090, 12160, 12369, 12399, 15660,
16640, 16911, 16914, 16932, 16977-16983, 17028; MICH. ComP. LAWS (Ma-

son, Supp. 1935) §§17115-17174; Mie. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§5020, 7740, 8806,
10302, 10304, 10358, 10369, 10662; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) §§889, 892-898; Mo.
STAT. ANN. (1932) §§63-67, 4071, 4072, 4079-4082, 4086, 4091, 4093, 4103, 4104.
5907, 5926, 11637, 13405, 14304, 14305; Nsa. ComP. STAT. (1929) §§2-505, 2-705,
8-165, 28-544 to 28-555, 30-321, 38-512, 79-2008, 84-711; NEv. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §§682, 10333, 10340-10349; NEv. Co-.Np. LAws (Hillyer, Supp. 1934)
§747.32; N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 387, §§28-31; N. J. ComP. STAT. (1911) tit.
Crimes, §§167-183. tit. Savings Banks and Savings Associations, §4715; N. J. ComP.
STAT. (Supp. 1934) tit. 52, §168; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtwright, 1929) §§35-1801
to 35-1802, 13-127, 71-149; N. M. LAWS 1931, c. 34; N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (Cahill,
1930) c. 41, §§1290, 1302, 1302-a, 1310-1313; N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (Cahill, Supp.
1935) c. 34, §§ 2 5-a, 25-b, 36-b, c. 41, §130-b; N. Y. CONsoL. LAWS (Cahill, Supp.
1937) c. 41, §1302-a; N. D. ComP. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§5217, 8387. 8388, 8800,
9827, 9929-9935; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) §§12467-12476(2), 12873,
12876, 12878, 12884, 12885, 12919; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1936) tit. 6, §§239, 240,
tit. 19 §641, tit. 21, §§341, 531, 1451-1456. 1463, tit. 46 §72; OKLA. STAT. ANN.'
(Supp. 1937) tit. 6, §§257-258; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 14, §19, tit. 18,
§§2481-2489, 2501-2514, 2516, 2531, 2532, 2551, 2552, 2571-2573, 2591, 2594, 2611,
2851; R.I. GEN. LAWS (1923) §§6073, 6074; S. C. CODE (1932) §§985, 1149, 1196,
1227, 1282, 1283. 1510; S. D. Comip. LAWS (1929) §§3354, 3766, 4227-4231, 4237,
6956. 8991. 9062; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §§671, 7943-7945, 10957,
10958. 10961 ; Tsx. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1935) arts. 95, 97, 541, 544, 567, 576,
588. 590, 1134. 1534-1536, 1541, 1544; TEx. ANN. REV. Civ. STAT. (1925) §§3467,
4234. 8318; TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon. 1937) arts. 427d, 544, 1544b; UTAH
REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) §§57-9-7, 87-5-10, 102-11-17 to 102-11-19, 102-13-15, 10315-2 to 103-15-7; VT. PUB. LAWS (1933) §§491, 5810, 8450-8457; WASH. REv. STAT.
ANN. (Remington, 1932 §§2569, 2571, 2601, 4226, 4227, 7091; W. VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie. 1932) §.11-14-15. 59-1-32. 61-3-20 to 61-3-23; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN.
(Courtwright, 1931) §§32-338 to 32-353, 109-516.
'ARz. REv. CoDF ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4765; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering. 1931) §484; GA. CODE (1933) §26-2809; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill. 1933) c.
38. §186; IOWA CODE (1935) §13030; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) §1358a;
ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 131, §10; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1933) c. 266, §30; Miss.
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of criminal statutes by the North Carolina court appears to furnish
sufficient guaranty that these broad provisions will be turned neither
into dead-letters nor into drag-nets. "By the rule of strict construction," says Chief Justice Stacy, in the Case under review, "is not
meant that the statute shall be stintingly or even narrowly construed,
but it means that everything shall be excluded from its operation which
does not dearly come within the scope of the language used." 57 At
any rate, the General Assembly will have the foregoing avenues of approach to guide it, if and when it undertakes to extend the law of embezzlement in North Carolina.
JAmES D. CARR.
Evidence-Opinion Evidence on the Issues before the Jury.
In a suit for benefits under the disability clause of an insurance
policy several witnesses were allowed to testify, over objection, that in
their opinion plaintiff was unable to farm, it having already been shown
that the plaintiff was not trained to perform any other work except
farming. On appeal the Court held that the evidence did not impinge
the rule that opinion evidence is inadmissible on the exact question
which the jury is to determine, and even if it did, it was not prejudicial,
as there was other evidence of like effect to which no objection was
made by the defendant.'
Although the witness has the necessary qualifications hnd the
opinion is conceded to be pertinent, nevertheless, many courts hold
that an opinion, whether expert or non-expert, cannot be admitted
when it touches the very issue before the jury.2 North Carolina in
many cases has purported to follow the rule. The local decisions fall
into the following classifications: 1. The rule is strictly applied and the
opinion is held inadmissible. 3 2. The existence of the rule is recogCODE ANN. (1930) §892; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtwright, 1929) §35-1802; N. Y.
CoNsot- LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, §1290; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 18,
§2486; S. C. CODE (1932) §1149; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §4451.

1 State v. Whitehurst, 212 N. C. 300, 303 (1937).
'Leonard v. The Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 212 N. C. 151, 193 S. E.
166'4(1937).
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §1921, n. 1.
'United States v. Sauls, 65 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) (where it was

held error to allow witness to testify that P's physical condition was such that he
could not engage continuously in a gainful occupation) ; Wolf and Co. v. Arthur,
112 N. C. 691, 16 S.E. 843 (1893) (where it was held error to allow witness to
testify that a transaction was bona fide) ; Smith v. Smith, 117 N. C. 326, 23 S.E.
270 (1895) (where it was held error to allow witness Ao state that deed, "was
good" as deceased "was a man of great will power") ; Phifer v. Carolina Cent, Ry.,
122 N. C. 940, 29 S.E. 578 (1898) (where it was held error to admit the answer
to the question "Were you careful?") ; Raynor v. Wilmington Seacoast R. I., 129
N. C. 195, 39 S. E. 821 (1901) (where the witness was not allowed to testify
Whether any more force was used by the officials in ejecting P from the train than
was necessary) ; Latta-Martin Pump Co. v. Southern Ry., 138 N. C. 301, 50 S.E.
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nized but held not to apply, the statement being construed as a-shorthand statement of fact, not as an opinion. 4 3. The admission of an
opinion is held not to be error if given in answer to a properly put
hypothetical question.5 4. A violation of the rule is noted, but is held
686 (1905) (where it was held error to allow witness to testify that there had
been an overcharge); Stewart v. Stewart, 155 N. C. 341, 71 S. E. 308 (1911)
(where it was held improper to allow witness to state that D exerted a controlling influence over the testator); Kerner v. Southern Ry., 170 N. C. 94, 86
S. E. 998 (1915) (where witness was not allowed to testify that the fire could
not possibly have started from a spark emitted from the smokestack and boiler
of P) ; Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Lexington, 176 N. C. 466, 97 S.E. 378
(1918) (where witness was not allowed to testify as to the amount of voltage
that killed the deceased) ; Marshall v. Interstate Tel. and Tel. Co., 181 N. C.
292, 106 S.E. 818 (1921) (where witness was allowed to testify that the place
where P was working was not safe, held error) ; Snyder v. Town of Asheboro,
182 N. C. 708, 110 S.E. 84 (1921) (where witness was not allowed to testify as
to whether it was necessary for P to put his hand on rollers to determine why
corn was not being ground); Stanley v. Whiteville Lumber-Co., 184 N. C. 302,
114 S.E. 385 (1922) (where witness was allowed to testify that if machine had
been covered with a protector P would not have been hit in the eye, held error) ;
Hill and Brooks v. Louisville and N. R. R., 186 N. C. 475, 119 S.E. 884 (1923)
(where it was held error to allow witness to give his opinion as to cause of damaged condition of mules) ; Pace v. McAden, 191 N. C. 137, 131 S.E. 629 (1926)
(where witness was not allowed to give opinion as to the location of a grant of
land) ; American Trust Co. v. United Cash Store Co., 193 N. C. 122, 136 S.E.
289 (1927) (where it was held error to allow witness to express an opinion as to
whether there was any fraud in the procurement of a note); Parks v. Sanford
and Brooks, 196 N. C. 36, 144 S.E. 364 (1928) (where witness was not allowed
to express an opinion as to whether a place was unsafe) ; State v. Carr, 196 N. C.
129, 144 S.E. 698 (1928), (1929) 7 N. C. L. Rnv. 320 (where it was held error to
allow witness to testify that it was impossible for deceased to have shot himself) ;
Brodm v. Monroe Coca Cola Bottling Co., 200 N. C. 55, 156 S. E. 152 (1930)
(where it was held error to allow witness to testify that glass found in the bottle
could not have passed through bottling machine) ; Denton v. Shenandoah Milling
Co., Inc., 205 N. C. 77, 170 S.E. 107 (1933) (where witness was not allowed to
testify as to the purchase and ownership of a draft by the bank) ; Potts v. Life
Ins. Co. of Va., 206 N. C. 257, 174 S. E. 123 (1934) (where witness was not
allowed to testify that the deceased was in sound health at the time policy was
issued) ; Minton v. Ferguson, 208 N. C. 541, 181 S. E. 553 (1935) (where it was
held error to allow witness to testify that he understood the article to have been
written with malice and to damage and slander P) ; Cheek v. Barnwell Warehouse
and Brokerage Co., 209 N. C. 569, 183 S.E. 729 (1936) (where it was held error
to allow witness to testify that the collision occurred on intestate's side of the
road) ; Bevan v. Carter, 210 N. C. 291, 186 S. E. 321 (1936) (where witness was
not allowed to testify that there was no possible way for him to avoid hitting P).
'Burney v. Allen, 127 N. C. 476, 37 S. E. 501 (1900) (where witness was
allowed to testify that from his knowledge of the room he would say that testator could have seen the paper when it was subscribed by the witness) ; Taylor v.
Security Life and Annuity Co., 145 N. C. 383, 59 S.E. 139 (1907) (where witness was allowed to testify that deceased was temperate) ; State v. Leak, 156 N.
C. 643, 72 S. E. 567 (1911) (where witness was allowed to testify that while D
was committing the assault he (D) "would kind of listen") ; Renn v. Seaboard
A. L. Ry., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915) (where P was allowed to testify
that he was careful while walking).
'The proper form of a hypothetical question, as set forth in Summerlin v.
Carolina and N. W. R. R., 133 N. C. 551, 554, 45 S.E. 898, 900 (1903), is: "If
certain -facts assumed in the question to be established by the evidence should be
found by the jury, what would be the witness's opinion, upon the facts thus found
true, of the matter involved and to which the inquiry is directed." Pace Mule Co.
v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 160 N. C. 252, 254, 75 S.E. 994, 995 (1912) (where witness in answer to question as to cause of death of mule testified, "My opinion is
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not to constitute a reversible error. 6 5. The rule is completely disregarded. 7 Opinion evidence is admitted on the very issue before the
jury when it involves the question of sanity,8 solvency, identity,' 0 handwriting,:" value, 12 or damages.' 3 This is apparently a recognition of
that the mule was jammed up in the car." This was held to be error, but the
court stated that should the jury find that mules had been jammed up in the car,
witness could testify that such jamming could have caused death of the mule) ;
Holder v. Giant Lumber Co., 161 N. C. 177, 76 S. E. 485 (1912) (where opinion
given as to effect of wound upon the knee, and cause of suffering); Lynch v.
Rosemary Mfg. Co., 167 N. C. 98, 83 S. E. 6 (1914) (where witness was allowed
to testify that the removal of deceased was the cause of the death); Martin v.
P. H. Hanes Knitting Co., 189 N. C. 644, 127 S. E. 688 (1925) (where witness
was allowed to give his opinion as to cause of death) ; Godfrey v. Western Carolina Power Co., 190 N. C. 24, 128 S.E. 485 (1925) (where witness was allowed
to say that certain conditions would produce certain results, namely malaria, of
which P complains).
'Prevette v. United States, 68 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), cert. denied
292 U. S. 622, 54 Sup.. Ct. 633, 78 L. ed. 1478 (1934) (where witness testified
that P was not totally and permanently disabled, held error but not prejudicial
because witnesses for P were allowed to express an opinion on the same issue) ;
Britt v. Carolina N. R. R., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S.E. 60 (1908) (where witness was
allowed to testify that double chain would be safer than a single chain, held if
error it was harmless) ; Wilson v.Suncrest Lumber Co., 186 N. C. 56, 1%&S. E.
797 (1923) (where witness testified that a certain appliance furnished P was not
proper, suitable, or safe); Street v. Erskine-Ramsey Coal Co., 196 N. C. 178,
145 S. E. 11 (1928) (where witness testified that "forepoling" would have protected the employee). The principal case falls within this classification, Leonard
v. The Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 212 N. C. 151, 193 S. E. 166 (1937),
cited supra note 1.
'Autry v. Floyd, 127 N. C. 186, 187, 37 S.E. 208 (1900) (where in an action for
malicious prosecution D was not allowed to answer question, "Were you influenced
by malice in instituting the prosecution?", held error) ; State Bd. of Ed. v. Roanoke R. R. and Lumber Co., 158 N. C. 313, 73 S. E. 994 (1912) (where witness
was allowed to testify that the land was "swamp land"); Barnes v. Seaboard
A. L. Ry., 178 N. C. 264, 100 S. E. 519 (1919) (where witness was not allowed
to testify that the method of loading was dangerous and unsafe, held error);
Vann v.Atlantic C. L. R. R., 182 N. C. 567, 109 S.E. 556 (1921) (where witness
was allowed to testify whether the crossing was constructed by the correct
method) ; State v. Fox, 197 N. C. 478, 149 S.E. 735 (1929) (where witness was
allowed to state that in his opinion deceased was lying down when shot) ; Nelson
v.Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 199 N. C. 443, 154 S.E. 752 (1930) (where
witness was allowed to testify that deceased was disabled both mentally and
physically) ; Dempster v. Fite, 203 N. C. 697, 167 S. E. 33 (1932) (where witness
was allowed to testify that the injury was total and permanent) ; Gossett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 N. C. 152, 179 S. E. 438 (1935) (where witness was
allowed to testify that P was not able to do any kind of physical work).
'Criminal actions: State v. Banner, 149 N. C. 519, 63 S.E. 84 (1908) ; State
v.Alexander, 179 N. C. 759, 103 S.E. 383 (1920). Civil actions: In re Will of
Brown, 203 N. C. 347, 166 S. E. 72 (1932); In rc Will of Sudie Hargro.ve, 206
N. C. 307, 173 S. E. 577 (1934).
'State v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121 S. E. 616 (1924) ; State v. Brewer,

202 N. C. 187, 162 S.E. 363, 81 A. L. R. 1431 (1932); State v. Shipman, 202
N. C. 518, 163 S.E. 657 (1932).
"'State v.Combs, 200 N. C. 671, 158 S.E. 252 (1931).
uLaRoque v. Kennedy, 156 N. C. 360, 72 S. E. 454 (1911) ; Note (1937) 106
A. L. R. 721 (concerning typewritten documents and typing machines).
21Wade v. Carolina Tel. and Tel. Co., 147 N. C. 219,'60 S. E. 987 (1908);
Note (1933) 86 A. L. R. 1449, 1488.
"Harper v.Town of Lenoir, 152 N. C. 723, 68 S. E. 228 (1910); South
Atlantic Waste Co. v. Raleigh C. & S. Ry., 167 N. C. 340, 83 S.E. 618 (1914).
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the impossibility of making proof of the fact in issue except by opinion
evidence.
The usual reason given for the rule is that the admission of such
evidence would be an invasion or usurpation of the province of the
jury. However, such evidence invades the province of the jury no more
than direct evidence of an eye-witness to a decisive fact. In either
case the evidence is conclusive of the issue only if the jury is satisfied
of the trustworthiness of the evidence. Of course, there is the danger 14
of too much weight being given the opinion of a reputable citizen, or
recognized expert, but that danger is lessened by a thorough crossexamination, testing the soundness of the conclusion, together with a
proper instruction by the trial judge. The reason stated for the rule
assumes that the jury will accept at face value all opinions. It overlooks the fact that the credibility of the witness as well as the reasonableness of his conclusion always remain for the jury's determination,
and that unless they are resolved by the jury favorably to the proponent of the witness, the latter's opinion will go for naught.
Inasmuch as North Carolina has purported to adopt the rule one
would expect to find the cases falling into two categories :15 (1) cases
in which the rule was held applicable; (2) cases in which it was held not
applicable. Instead we find five categories-and without any attempt
by the Court to explain the necessity for their existence. Nor do the
factual situations in the cases themselves reveal any basis for the
classification, with the result that there is not only no apparent reason
for the five-part classification but no element of predictability as to
what the Court will do in a particular case.
The test for the admissibility of an opinion of a witness should
be, not whether it is on the very issue before the jury, but whether it
will aid the jury under the circumstances of the case. Evidence on
the very point in issue would seem to be of the highest pertinency.
Thus a strict application of the rule leads to the absurd result that
admissibility varies in inverse proportion to relevancy. A study of all
the cases reveals the impracticability of its application, and leads to but
one logical conclusion. Not only should the limitation itself be discarded, but the opinion rule' 6 in its entirety should be abolished. This
7
could be easily accomplished by statute.1
Wm. R. DAWES.
' In (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 320, 321 the question is raised, "Is there a real
danger attached to admitting these opinions, or isn't this overshadowed by the
extremely ,high value and importance of this type of evidence?"
With a possible third category of cases in which the rule was either erroneously applied or not applied but held not to constitute reversible error.
"For history and discussion of the opinion rule, see 4 WIGmORE, EviDENCE
(2d ed. 1923) §§1917-1929..
' Dean Wigmore has suggested the following statute: "An inference or opin-
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Libel-Ambiguous Words.
Plaintiff, automobile dealer, had a contract with defendant credit
company, to assist him in financing his purchases. He placed an order
for several vehicles, but before they arrived defendant sent him the following telegram, "Due to your previously having converted floor
planned cars will not be able to lift draft number D-3105 stop necessary to make other arrangements at once." Plaintiff, alleging that
the sending of the above telegram was a publication of defamatory
matter concerning him, sued the defendant for libel. The jury in the
trial court found for the plaintiff. Held, the trial judge should have
granted defendant's motion for non-suit as there was neither allegation
nor proof that the telegram was understood by the employees of the
telegraph company, to whom alone publication was made, as conveying
a defamatory meaning.1
The great weight of authority is to the effect that a libel is published by the communication of the defamatory matter to some third
person or persons. 2 This communication can be effected in various
ways; by dictating a libelous letter to a stenographer, 3 by delivering a
message containing defamatory matter to the telegraph company, 4 by
the transmission of a message from one agent of the telegraph company to another,5 by the writing of a libel on an envelope which is
put in the mail, 6 by the author reading a defamatory message to some
ion may always be stated to the tribunal by a witness experientially qualified to
form it, provided either that he has had adequate personal observation of the
matter in question, or if not, and if an expert, that he states on cross-examination
the data from which the inference is drawn. It is immaterial whether or not the
data are capable of being so stated by him or by others that the tribunal is equally
capable of drawing the inference, and whether or not the data are stated by him
before stating his inference, and whether or not the inference involves the very
subject of the issue, or one of the issues, before the tribunal; provided that the
trial judge may in any case in his discretion exclude testimony involving an inference -from data observed, or any other superfluous testimony, whenever in his
judgment such testimony is undesirable because merely cumulative or of undue
personal weight." 4 WiOrmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §1929.

'Wright v. Commercial Credit Co., 212 N. C. 87, 192 S. E. 844 (1937).
'Vicknair v. Daily States Pub. Co., 153 La. 676, 96 So. 529 (1923) ; Sproul
v. Pillsbury, 72 Me. 20 (1880); Lewis v. Carr, Guy and Baird, 178 N. C. 578,

101 S.E. 97 (1919) ;

NEWELL, SLANDER AIMD LiEr. (4th ed. 1924) §175; GAThEY,
(2d ed. 1929) 91.
'Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135 (E. D. N. Y. 1921); Ferdon v. Dickens,
161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888 (1909); Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 AtI.
730, 52 L. R. A. 87 (1901) ; Pullman v. Walter Hill and Co. Ltd., [1891] 1 Q. B.
524.
LIBE

AND SLANDER

, Munson v. Lathrop, 96 Wis. 386, 71 N. W. 596 (1897).

'Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co,, 75 Minn. 368, 77- N. W. 985. 43
L. R. A. 981 (1899) ; Whitfield v. Southeastern Ry., 4 Jur. (N. s.) 688 (Eng.
1858).
0 Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123 (1890).
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third person before sending it to the addressee, 7 and, according to some
of the courts, by mailing a postal card on which a libel is written.8
It is universally held that where the words on which the action
is based are ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning, some innocent and others defamatory, their interpretation is a question for the
jury;9 and the judge construes them only when reasonable men could
not differ concerning their meaning. 10
A large majority of the courts in this country hold that the testimony of hearers or readers as to their understanding of alleged defamatory matter is admissible only when the words in controversy are
ambiguous," and even then the witnesses' interpretations are not binding or conclusive on the jury.' 2 However, the minority hold this evidence inadmissible because, they say, since facts never conspire to
commit perjury and witnesses sometimes do, it is better to permit
the persons to whom publication was made to testify only as to circumstances under which the words were spoken or written and
Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43 (N. Y. 1849).
'M'Cann v. Edinburg Roperie and Sailcloth Co., L. R. 28 Ir. 24 (1891);
contra, McKeel v. Latham, 202 N. C. 318, 162 S. E. 747 (1932) overruling
Logan v. Hodges, 146 N. C. 38, 59 S.E. 349 (1907).
'Baker v. Warner, 231 U. S. 588, 34 Sup. Ct. 175, 58 L. ed. 384 (1913);
Commercial Pub. Co. v. Smith, 149 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); Washington
Times Co. v. Murray, 299 Fed. 903 (App. D. C. 1924); Ogren v. The Rockford
Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587 (1919); Branch v. Publishers;
George Knapp Co., 222 Mo. 580, 121 S.W. 93 (1909); Sucha v. Sprecher, 84
Neb. 241, 121 N. W. 106 (1909); First Nat'l Bank of Waverly v. Winters, 225
N. Y. 47, 121 N. E. 459 (1918) ; Lucas v. Nichols, 52 N. C. 32 (1859) ; State v.
Howard, 169 N. C. 312, 84 S.E. 807 (1915); Vincent v. Pace, 178 N. C. 421, 100
S. E. 581 (1919); McCue v. Equity Co-op. Pub. Co. of Fargo, 39 N. D. 190, 167
N. W. 225 (1918) ; Hubbard v. Furman Univ., 76 S.C. 510, 57 S.E. 478 (1907);
Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 150 S.W. 874 (1912); York v. Cole,
190 Wis. 179, 208 N. W. 944 (1926) ; NEwELL, SLANDER AND LIB.L (4th ed. 1924)
§254; (1928) 7 N. C. L. Rtv. 3, 5. However, where words innocent on their face
are capable of a defamatory meaning only by reason of extrinsic facts, plaintiff
must show these facts and also prove that they were known to the hearers or
readers. Daily v. New York Herald Co., 151 Fed. 114 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1907) ;
Ten Broeck v. Journal Printing Co. and Another, 166 Minn. 173, 207 N. W. 497
(1926); Duncan v. The Record Pub. Co., 145 S. C. 196, 143 S. E. 31 (1928) ;
Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985, 144 S.E. 624 (1928); (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 3, 5.
"Commercial Pub. Co. v. Smith, 149 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) ; E. I. Du
Pont De Nemours Co. v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 12 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A.
6th, 1926) ; First Nat'l Bank of Waverly v. Winters, 225 N. Y. 47, 121 N. E. 459
(1918); McCue v. Equity Co-op. Pub. Co. of Fargo, 39 N. D. 190, 167 N. W.
225 (1918); NEwELL, SLANDER AND LIBr (4th ed. 1924) §254; GATLEY, LIBEL
AND SLANDER (2d ed. 1929) 129;- (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 3, 5.
" Hawks v. Patton, 18 Ga. 52 (1854) ; Proctor v. Pointer, 127 Ga. 134, 56 S.E.
111 (1906); Branch v. Publishers; George Knapp and Co., 222 Mo. 580, 121 S.
W. 93 (1909) ; Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137 (1860) ; Shaw v. Shaw, 49 N.
H. 533 (1870); Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 130 S. C. 180, 125 S. E. 912 (1924);
Knapp v. Fuller and Smith, 55 Vt. 311 (1883).
"Emery Evening Printing Co. v. Butler, 144 Fed. 916 (C. C. A. 3d, 1906);
Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 I1. 236 (1869); Freeman v. Sanderson, 123 Ind. 264,
24 N. E. 239 (1890); Lemaster v. Ellis, 173 Mo. 332, 158 S. W. 904 (1913);
Frazier v. Grobb, 194 Mo. App. 405, 183 S.W. 1083 (1916) ; Smart v. Blanchard,
42 N. H. 137 (1860); Smith v. Miles, 15 Vt. 245 (1843).
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then let the jury draw their own conclusions."3 The Nortl Carolina
rule allows witnesses to give evidence as to their understanding of
alleged defamatory matter only when the language in question consists
of cant phrases, local words, or nicknames, or when the defendant takes
advantage of facts, known to the hearers or readers, to give otherwise
innocent words a defamatory meaning. 14 The above rules of evidence
are applied by the courts to both slander and libel cases, and they rely
on cases in one field to support holdings in the other.
The question what formula should be given the jury to guide them
in determining whether or not ambiguous words, alleged to be defamatory, are, in fact, defamatory has received but little attention.
However, most of the courts hold that they should apply the so-called
objective or reasonable man test. 15 A few of the decisions go even
further in the case of a publication made to small children, and hold it
unnecessary to prove the children understood the meaning of the words
used.' 6 In one case it is stated, by way of dictum, that where the
defamatory matter is written, even though in a foreign language, the
plaintiff does not have to prove that the persons to whom publication
was made understood the language. 17 Although a number of the
state courts pay lip service to the subjective, or actual understanding
of the hearers' test I8 only a few really apply it.' °
'White v. Sayward, 33 Me. 322 (1851); Callahan v. Ingram, 122 Mo. 355,
26 S. W. 1020 (1894); Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns 211 (N. Y. 1809);
NEWFLL, SLANDER AND Lv3Ex. (4th ed. 1924) §270.
"Briggs v. Byrd, 33 N. C. 353 (1850); See Sasser v. Rouse, 35 N. C. 142,
144 (1851) ; Sowers v. Sowers, 87 N. C. 303, 305 (1883).
'Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U. S. 290, 39 Sup. Ct. 448 63 L ed.
987 (1919); Commercial Pub. Co. v. Smith, 149 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907);
Washington Times Co. v. Murray, 299 Fed. 903 ('App. D. C. 1924); Nelson v.
Borchenius, 52 Ill. 236 (1869) ; Ball v. Evening American Pub. Co., 237 Ill. 592,
86 N. E. 1097 (1909) ; King v. Pillsbury, 115 Me. 528, 99 Atl. 513 (1917) ; Sucha
v. Sprecher, 84 Neb. 241, 121 N. W. 106 (1909); McCall v. Sustair, 157 N. C.
177, 72 S. E. 974 (1911) ; State v. Howard, 169 N. C. 312, 84 S E. 807 (1915) ;
Cotton v. Fisheries Co. 177 N. C. 56, 97 S. E. 712 (1919) ; Vincent v. Pace, 178
N. C. 421, 100 S. E. 581 (1919); Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 189 N. C.
658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925) ; Gates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N. C.
14, 189 S. E. 869 (1933). However, since the court in the principal case held that
the defendant's motion of non-suit should have been granted, one wonders whether
or not it will be necessary in North Carolina, in the future, to allege that the
hearers or readers actually understood the language in its defamatory sense, regardless of the meaning it would convey to the reasonable man.
"aHammond v. Stewart, 72 Ill. App. 512 (1897) ; Batten v. Cox, 118 Kan. 78,
233 Pac. 1040 (1925).
See Palmer v. Harris, 60 Pa. 156, 161 (1869).
'Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48 (1867); Cosland v. Lee,
11 Ind. App. 511, 38 N. E. 1099 (1894) ; Floyd v. Fordyce 53 Ind. App. 449, 101
N. E. 825 (1913) ; Briggs v. Bird, 33 N. C. 252 (1850).; Castello v. Phelps, 198
N. C. 454, 152 S. E. 163 (1930).
"Desmond v. Brown, 33 Iowa 13 (1871) ; Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209
Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1907); Lemaster v. Ellis, 173 Mo. App. 332, 158 S. W.
904 (1913) ; Traylor v. White, 185 Mo. App. 325, 170 S. W. 412 (1914) ; Thomas
v. City of Kennett, 192 Mo. App. 13, 178 S. W. 254 (1915) ; Nichols v. Chicago
R. I. and P. Ry., 232 S. W. 275 (Mo. 1921).
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Since the majority rule allows witnesses to testify as to their understanding of the words in question only when the language relied on is
ambiguous, 20 the subjective standard seems to be inconsistent with it
because the jury would have difficulty in determining the sense in
which the words were understood by the hearers or readers without
first hearing these persons testify as to their understanding. The
application of the subjective standard in North Carolina would be even
more inconsistent as our courts admit this testimony only in a restricted
class of defamation cases. 21 In those jurisdictions which follow the
minority and never admit such evidence, 22 the use of the subjective test
would be positively absurd. Again, there seems to be no good reason
for giving the jury a subjective formula when the judge, in deciding
whether or not the case shall go to the jury, uses the objective standard, 23 which is much easier to understand and apply. The danger of
perjured testimony is greatly reduced by the use of the objective formula as it is not necessary to admit evidence concerning the sense in
which the persons, to whom publication was made, understood the
alleged defamatory words.
In view of the foregoing considerations, if reasonable men could
have differed as to the meaning of the term "converted floor planned
cars," then it seems the view of the dissenting opinion in the principal
case should have been followed and the verdict of the jury left undisturbed.

J. NATHANIEL HAMRICK.

Iames-Married Women-Change of Name by Legal
Process--Notice.
The plaintiff's judgment was obtained before but docketed in
debtor's former name after her marriage. Debtor then sold afteracquired real property to defendant. Plaintiff was permitted to enforce
a lien under the statute' providing that a docketed judgment constitutes a lien on after-acquired real property from the time of docketing
until ten years after its rendition. The court evidently felt that defendant had constructive notice of the judgment since he knew debtor's
former name and a record search under that name would have revealed
2
the judgment.
'0See note 11, supra.

' See note 14, supra.

' See note 13, supra.

' See note 10, supra.

'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§613, 614; McCaskill v. Graham, 121 N.
C. 190, 28 S. E. 264 (1897) (land subject to judgment lien is freed therdfrom

after the lapse of ten years) ; Harrington v. Hatton, 130 N. C. 89, 40 S. E. 848
(1902) (land subject to judgment lien can be sold free from the lien after the
lapse of the judgment).
'Henry v. Sanders, 212 N. C. 239, 193 S. E. 15 (1937).
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Since the court does not indicate whether the result would have
been different had defendant not known of debtor's former name, the
decision possibly might be construed as imposing a duty on the title
searcher to search for judgments under debtor's former name. To
require the title searcher to realize the obvious fact that married women
had former names, and to search under those names for claims would
not seem to be unduly harsh. Certainly, a careful title searcher in
North Carolina should realize the above possibility and make the
requisite search.
Defendant, to show lack of notice, relied on a California case 3
where a judgment was secured and docketed in debtor's maiden name
after her marriage on obligations incurred before marriage. The California court held that although defendant knew debtor's maiden name,
this fact did not put him on notice as to her business transactionc
while unmarried, since a married woman was enabled by statute to
acquire and convey property under her married name. The North
Carolina court said the reasoning of the case was persuasive, but
declined to apply it to the facts in the principal case. The only fundamental factual difference between the two cases, in so far as the point
under discussion is concerned, is that in the California case the action
was brought after the marriage, while in the principal case judgment
was rendered by a Justice of the Peace before the marriage. The North
Carolina court might reasonably have considered this factual difference a valid ground for distinction. In North Carolina a judgment
rendered by a Justice of the Peace must be docketed in the office of
the Clerk of the Superior Court of the county within a year if it is to
act as a lien on the debtor's after-acquired property. 4 Therefore, if
such a judgment were obtained before the debtor's marriage, it could be
discovered by a search under debtor's former name before her marriage, and only one year, at most, after her marriage. But, if such a
judgment in debtor's former name were obtained after her marriage,
or a judgment of the superior court were obtained either before or
after marriage, and such judgments when docketed were constructive
notice after marriage, the efficient title searcher would be required to
search under debtor's maiden name for at least ten years prior to the
sale or mortgage. Since the latter requirement would put quite a burden
on the title searcher, this might have been the distinction in the Court's
'Huff v. Sweetster, 8 Cal. App. 689, 97 Pac. 705 (1908).
'Lowdermilk v. Butler, 182 N. C. 502, 509, 109 S. E. 571, 575 (1921). It was
urged on the court that the judgment was not required by statute to be docketed
within a year in order to be a lien on the property, but the court held to the
contrary, in line with former cases. No specific statutes were mentioned in the
opinion, but the ones under discussion probably were what are now N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§1517, 1521.
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mind between the California and principal cases. Hence, if a case
arose involving a judgment of a Justice of the Peace rendered after
debtor's marriage but not docketed within a year of the marriage,
or a judgment of the superior court obtained either before or after
marriage, but not docketed within a year after the marriage, the Court,
distinguishing the principal case on its facts, might follow the California case and hold that docketing the judgment in debtor's former
name is not constructive notice to persons subsequently dealing with
debtor in her married name.
The principal case suggests a similar problem: If A has a properly
docketed judgment against B, what would A's rights be if B changed his
name by legal process, acquired real property, and then mortgaged or
sold it to C, who was unaware of B's change of name? This situation
is to be distinguished from that of change of name by marriage, since
here there would be nothing to put the title searcher C on notice as to
the name change. Here A and C have done all that could be .expected
of them. If North Carolina should choose to follow the principle of the
California case, probably C would be held not to have had constructive
notice of the lien, and hence would have a superior right to the property.
An argument in favor of A's priority could be made that the record
of the name change of B serves as constructive notice to the world, and
therefore land bought or taken as security by C is taken with constructive notice of the prior lien, since a search of the records under B's
former name would have revealed it. Although the North Carolina
Court has not passed on the point, the language of the statute pertaining to change of name seems to suggest that the legislature intended
the record to serve as public -notice. 5
An argument against A's contention is that the statute does not
expressly provide that the record of the name change shall charge with
notice parties subsequently dealing with B. Had the legislature intended
that the record of the name change be notice to the world, it would
have expressly so provided.
No matter which view the court takes, its decision will probably be
affected by the practical consideration whether it desires further to
burden title searchers.
If, before C seeks to acquire the land, A should discover B's change
of name, he would probably be under no duty to amend the judgment,
if we assume that C would have constructive notice of B's change in
'N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1935) §§2970-2975 (After the requirements as to
reason for changing name, character, etc., have been satisfied it is the duty of
the clerk of the superior court to grant the application for name change, and to
issue an order changing the name of the applicant. He must issue a certificate
under his hand and seal to this effect, and he must record the application and
order on the docket of special proceedings in his court.).
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name. However, because name changes occur so seldom, and because title searchers inquire so infrequently into this aspect of the
records, as a practical matter A should be required to take reasonable
steps to correct the record. And, conversely, if C should discover B's
change in name, he should be charged with knowledge of what a search
of the record under B's original name would reveal.
If the record of the name change does not serve as constructive
notice of the change, the problem remains whether the docketing of the
judgment in B's prior name is, in and of itself, notice to the world of
A's lien. If it is, of course, A would prevail over C. There is, however, substantial ground for contending that the mere docketing of
A's judgment in B's former name would not be constructive notice to
C. The North Carolina Court has consistently said that the doctrine
of record notice is to be strictly applied,6 and in searching the record ". .

if anything appears, to a party calculated to attract attention

or stimulate inquiry the person is affected with notice of all the inquiry
would have disclosed". 7 This, and other statements,8 furnish grounds for
argument that there was no constructive notice to C of A's lien, since
a thorough tracing of the chain of title would in no way indicate the
change of B's name so as to stimulate inquiry on the part of C's title
searcher. If the court should hold neither record of name change,
nor record of judgment in B's prior name to be constructive notice,
then of course, C would prevail against A as a bona fide actor without notice.
JOSEPH M. KITTNER.

Negligence-Proximate Cause-Weather Conditions.
The defendant railroad allowed its train to block a highway at
night for twenty minutes during a snow storm without lights or any
other warning of its presence. The deceased was killed when the
automobile in which he was riding as guest skidded on the icy highway and collided with the train. The visibility of the driver of the
automobile was impaired by falling snow and he could not see the train
'Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 19 S. E. 99 (1894).; New Bern Cotton
Oil and Fertilizer Co. v. Lane, 173 N. C. 184, 91 S. E. 953 (1917); Dye v. Morrison,
181 N. C. 309, 107 S. E. 138 (1921).
7
Wynn v. Grant, 166 N. C. 39, 45, 81 S. E. 949, 952 (1914).
'Bryan v. Hodges, 107 N. C. 492, 498, 12 S. E. 430, 432 (1890) ("... if the

party obtains knowledge or information of facts tending to show the existence of
a prior claim in conflict with the interest which he is seeking to obtain, and which
are sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry... he is affected with
knowledge of all the inquiry would have disclosed.") ; Ijames v. Gaither, 93 N. C.
358, 362 (1885) ("For whatever is sufficient to put a party on inquiry, he is presumed to have notice of every fact and circumstance which a proper inquiry
would enable him, to find out."). It could be argued, in the problem under discussion, that there were not sufficient facts or circumstances to put C on inquiry.
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in time to stop or; the icy road. In an action against the railroad for
the wrongful death of the deceased the lower court gave judgment
for the plaintiff but the appellate court reversed, saying that as a matter
of law the ice was the proximate cause of the injury and the railroad
was not liable.'
The problem raised in the principal case is to be distinguished from
the problem of insulating negligence. North Carolina has recognized
that the negligence of a third party may intervene and insulate the negligence of a defendant, on the ground that the insulating negligence becomes the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.2 In the principal
case there was no intervening insulating negligence. The weather condition (icy road), which the court in the principal case said was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, existed before the railroad became negligent in blocking the highway. Also no question of concurring negligence is involved because there was no negligence on the part
of the driver of the automobile. The court made it clear that there was
no such negligence, but even if there had been it would not have been
imputed to the plaintiff guest so as to prevent recovery in the absence
of a joint enterprise, 3 or joint control.
The problem in the principal case is presented in two groups of cases
with somewhat similar fact situations:
1. Where the train was moving when the collision occurred.
Recovery has been denied when a moving train, in the absence of
fog or other adverse weather conditions, failed to give any signals, and
hit an automobile that was skidding over ice,4 or other slippery substances. 5 Here the courts said the skidding and not the defendant's neg'Megan v. Stevens, 91 F. (2d) 419 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
- Haney v. Lincolnton, 207 N. C. 282, 176 S.E. 573 (1934), (1934) 13 N. C.
L. Rzv. 245.
'Miller v. Union Pac. R. R., 290 U. S. 227, 154 Sup. Ct. 172, 78 L. ed. 285
(1933); City of Louisville v. Heitkemper's Adm'x, 169 Ky. 167, 183 S. W. 465
(1916) ; Thomas v. City of Lexington, 168 Miss. 107, 150 So. 816 (1933) ; Dickey
v. Atlantic C. L. . ., 196 N. C. 726, 147 S.E. 15 (1929). These cases should
not be confused with those in which there is a duty upon the guest to warn the
driver, because of the guest's peculiar knowledge of the dangerous situation. In
such a case the guest is deemed negligent and not permitted to ,recover. Warth
v. Jackson County Court, 71 W. Va. 184, 76 S.E. 420 (1912).
'Hickey v. Missouri Pac. P. R. Corp. in Neb., 8 F. (2d) 128 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925) (Here there was some conflict in testimony as to whether defendant gave
any warning.); Barrett v. United States R. P. Adm'n, 196 Iowa 1143, 194 N. W.
222 (1923); Strand v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 75 Mont. 384, 393, 243 Pac.
1089, 1092 (1926) (proximate cause is one "which in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.").
'Pifer v. Chicago M. St. P. & P. R.R., 215 Iowa 1258, 247 N. W. 625 (1933)
(Here gravel was upon the road and the court held, as a matter of law, that the
skidding over this gravel was the proximate cause of the collision.) ; Gilman v.
Central Vt. Ry., 93 Vt. 340, 107 Atl. 122 (1919) (The skidding was caused by oil
upon the road. The court stated that the railroad company could anticipate that
travelers would see the train in time to stop. The court also stressed the fact
that the railroad company was not responsible for the oil being upon the road.).
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ligence in failing to give warning was the proximate cause of the injury.
However, one court in New York held that under such circumstances
it was error for the lower court to grant a motion for a nonsuit in an

action by the car driver.6 There is a split of authority as to whether a
railroad is liable when its train approaches a crossing during a foggy
night without giving any warning, and a collision occurs. In a majority of such cases, the railroad was deemed negligent and a recovery

was allowed, 7 the court assuming without discussion that the negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury. One case represents the contrary view and the court denies recovery on the same facts," saying that

there was no negligence.
2. Where the train was stopped when the collision occurred. It is
well settled that a railroad company, in its necessary operations, can

block a highway for a reasonable time and under ordinary conditions the
mere presence of the train is sufficient warning to travelers,

But if the

visibility of the people upon the highway is impaired by fog or other adverse weather conditions and a train blocks the road without giving any

warning, there is a split of authority as to whether the railroad company
is liable for a resulting collision with an automobile.

In some cases the

railroad is relieved from liability,' 0 again, on the ground of no negligence.

But many courts hold the railroad liable under such circum-

stances,11 especially where it has induced reliance by customarily giv-

'Swinderman v. Pennsylvania R.. R., 243 App. Div. 233, 276 N. Y. Supp. 483
(1935) (The court, in reversing a nonsuit, held that whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in driving eight miles an hour over the slippery road was a
question for the jury.).
Fretz v. Chicago & Erie R. R., 173 Ind. 519, 90 N. E. 76 (1909) ; Holland v.
Missouri Pac. R. R., 112 Kan. 609, 212 Pac. 90 (1923); Robertson v. Missouri
Pac. R. R., 165 So. 527.(La. 1936) ; Kerr v. Bush, 198 Mo. App. 607, 215 S. W.
393 (1919); Agee v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 288 S. W. 992 (Mo. 1926); Malone
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 220 Mo. App. 9, 285 S. W. 123 (1926); Briggs
v. New York S. & W. R. R., 136 At. 416 (N. J. 1927).
8Dunlap v. Pacific Electric Ry., 12 Cal. App. (2d) 473, 55 P. (2d) 894 (1936).
°Mabray v. Union Pac. P. R., 5 F. Supp. 397 (D. Colo. 1933); Sisson v.
Southern Ry., 68 F. (2d) 403 (App. D. C. 1933); Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. Dillon,
31 Del. 247, 114 Atl. 62 (1921) ; Coleman v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R., 287 Ill. App.
483, 5 N. E. (2d) 103 (1936); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Huss, 96 Ind. App. 71, 180
N. E. 919 (1932); Witherly v. Bangor & A. R. R., 131 Me. 4, 158 Atl. 362
(1932); Ausen v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. R., 193 Minn. 316, 258 N.
W. 511 (1935); Gulf, M. &. N. R. R. v. Holifield, 152 Miss. 674, 120 So. 750
(1929); Gulf M. & N. R. R. v. Kennard, 164 Miss. 380, 145 So. 110 (1933);
Nadasky v. Public Service R. R., 97 N. J. L. 400, 117 Atl. 478 (1922); Killen
v. New York C. R. R., 225 App. Div. 8, 232 N. Y. Supp. 76 (1928); Scott v.
Delaware L. & W. R. R., 222 App. Div. 409, 226 N. Y. Supp. 287 (1928);
Thompson v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. of Tex., 55 S. W. (2d) 1084 (Tex. 1932).
"Driskell v. Powell, 67 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Bowers v. Great
N. Ry., 65 N. D. 384, 259 N. W. 99 (1935); Morris v. Atlantic C. R. R., 100
N. J. L. 328, 126 Atl. 295 (1924).
Central of Ga. Ry. v. Heard, 36 Ga. App. 332, 136 S. E. 533 (1927) ; Shelley
v. Pollard, 55 Ga. App. 88, 189 S. E. 570 (1936) ; Richard v. Maine Cent. P. L,
132 Me. 197, 168 Atl. 811 (1933) ; Elliot v. Missouri Pac. R. P., 227 Mo. App
225, 52 S. W. (2d)' 448 (1932); Adams v. Kansas City S. Ry., 83 S. W. (2d)
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ing signals. 12 Here again the courts decide the cases on the basis of
negligence, assuming that the negligence was the proximafe cause of
the injury. It has been held that when an automobile skidded over a
slippery road and caught a pedestrian between it and a train which was
blocking the road, thus injuring him, no recovery could be had against
the railroad since the skidding was the proximate cause of the injury.13
Several courts say that if the condition at the crossing is extra-hazardous the railroad is negligent in not using extra precautions when it
blocks the highway, 14 but this information still leaves to be determined
what is meant by extra-hazardous.
Questions similar to that in the principal case also arise from various
fact situations which do not involve railroads. Where a defendant maintained a defective shed near an alley and the plaintiff's motorcycle
skidded over the ice in the alley and hit the shed which fell upon him,
it was held that the defendant was liable.' 5 On the other hand, where
an automobile skidded into a defective bridge, negligently kept by the
city, the skidding on the ice and not the negligence of the defendant city
was held to be the proximate cause of the injury.16
There are several courts which say that if an act of God concurs
with the act of the defendant to cause an injury the defendant is nevertheless liable.' 7

This principle has been extended to cover a case in

which sparks negligently emitted from the defendant's train burned a
canvas from the plant bed of the plaintiff, thus making it possible for
frost to kill the plants.' 8 Here the railroad was held liable on the ground
that its negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
913 (Mo. 1935); Short v. Pennsylvania R. R, 46 Ohio App. 77, 187 N. E. 737

(1933) ; Prescott v. Hines, 114 S. C. 262, 103 S. E. 543 (1920).
"Mallet v. Southern Pac. Co., 65 P. (2d) 93 (Cal. 1937), aff'd on rehearing,
68 P. (2d) 281 (1937).
" Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R. R. v. McLain, 105 S. W. (2d) 206 (Tex. 1937) (The
court in the principal case cited a decision of the intermediate court in this case as
being contra to its holding. However, the state supreme court reversed the holding in the intermediate court so that the final decision is in accord with the principal case.).
" See outhern Ry. v. Lambert, 230 Ala. 162, 160 So. 262, 263 (1935); Los
Angeles & Salt Lake R. R v. Lytle, 56 Nev. 192, 47 P. (2d) 934 (1935).
'Durst v. Wareham, 132 Kan. 785, 297 Pac. 675 (1931) (In principle this case
seems to be contrary to the principal case. Although they are very different
otherwise on their facts, in both cases a vehicle skidded over an icy road into a
stationary object. It would seem that the skidding bore the same relation to the
injury in both cases, but the courts reached different results on the proximate
cause point.).
"McCracken v. Curwensville Borough, 309 Pa. 98, 163 Atl. 217 (1932) (Here
the borough was held liable because it had failed to perform its duty in keeping
the ice removed from the streets. The court was definite in pointing out that the
ice was the proximate cause of the injury.).
X'Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 6th,
1933) ; Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Hendry, 112 Fla. 391, 150 So. 598 (1933).
" Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R R., 55 Fla. 514, 46 So. 732
(1908).
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From this review of the cases it can be seen that the result in the
principal case is in accord with' that reached in a majority of the cases
with similar fact situations, and under it the railroad is absolved from
all liability. Skidding caused by ice or slippery road, but not poor visibility due to fog, rain or snow, prevents defendant's negligence, granting that defendant is negligent, from operating as the proximate cause
of the collision. If the cases which say that extra precautions are demanded of the railroad where the condition is extra-hazardous mean
anything more than a mere gesture of sympathy from the courts it is
suggested that the principal case was a proper one for the use of extra
precautions by the railroad. The question whether the railroad should
have been aware of the icy condition of the highway might also be raised
in an effort to determine whether it should reasonably have foreseen the
plaintiff's injury. This would have some bearing on the court's decision as to the proximate cause of the injury. The court could reasonably have held that the negligence of the railroad and not the ice, was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
C. W. GRIFFIN.
Taxation-North Carolina Gift Tax.
In 1932 with the increase in emergency expenditures and the need
for additional revenues mounting, Congress raised the rates on the federal estate tax. Coincidentally with large increases in federal estate tax
rates, escape, by means of gifts to prospective heirs, was made more
difficult by the enactment of a federal gift tax statute.1 The purpose of
the tax as stated in the report of the Senate Committee on Finance is as
follows: "As a protection to both estate and income taxes, a gift tax is
imposed." Quick to follow the lead of the federal government the
states of Oregon 2 and Wisconsin3 enacted similar gift taxes the next
year. Virginia followed in 1934. 4 Not until 1937, however, did North
Carolina, "5 along with Colorado6 and Minnesota, 7 thus attempt to tap
this additional source of revenue.8
147 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §550 (1935). The 1932 act was amended
in 1934 whereby the rates were increased and the specific exemption lowered from
$50,000 to $40,000. 48 STAT. 758 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. §§551-554 (1935). The
constitutionality of the gift tax was upheld in Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S.
124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46, 74 L. ed. 226 (1929). For a helpful treatise on the federal
gift tax see BRnwsTER, IVINS, AND PHILLIPS, THE FEDERAL GIFT TAx (1933);
WINSLOW, DEATH TAXES (3d ed. 1937) pp. 66-124.
2
'OR.
CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) §§1601-1628.
'Wis. Laws 1933, c. 363 §4.
'VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) app. tax code §120(1).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156) ee-nn.
6 CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) c. 75A.
'Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1937, c. 70.
'Unsuccessful attempts were made to pass gift tax statutes in the following
states. 1934-La., Wash.; 1935-Ark., Cal., Pa., Wyo.; 1937-Conn., Del., D.
C., Ind. On the problem of jurisdiction, not considered herein, see (1937) 64
TRUST COMPANIES MAG.

577.
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The North Carolina tax, like that of the federal government, is levied
upon the donor. It is due for the first time on March 15, 1938.' While
our act is undoubtedly an offspring of the federal tax, yet there are
many striking differences between this offspring and its parent. The
language of the act suggests many puzzling questions, but an examination of some of its more important provisions, along with the federal
act and those of other states, may help to clear up the seemingly ambiguous sections.
I. RATES-The rates of the federal tax are approximately threequarters of the federal estate tax rates, and are graduated according to
the amount of the gift.t0 The same rates apply regardless of whether
the donee is of the blood of the donor or an utter stranger. As has
been pointed out, the tax was passed to offset in a degree the escape
from the estate tax by way of gifts. However, the gift tax still furnishes an incentive for the donor to divide part of his estate by way of
inter vivos gifts. The "bargain" offered by this tax can be illustrated in
the. following example. Suppose A is possessed of a net estate of
$1,000,000. If he dies without having disposed of any of this property
the estate tax would be $177,800 (reflecting the 80y credit for state
taxes). But if A gave away $200,000 of this property during his
life, the tax on such gift would be only $14,212, even though the gift
be only to one person and all made in the same year. This would leave
$800,000 to be taxed at his death which tax would amount to $131,400.
Thus, by taking advantage of the gift tax rates and splitting the transfers so, that each has fallen into a lower tax bracket, A saves $32,188
in federal taxes, assuming that the gifts need not thereafter be included
in the donor's estate. The'division or partial distribution of an estate
through gifts will also ordinarily result in reducing the combined total
of income taxes assessed against the donor and donees by dropping the
donor's income into lower brackets and so reducing his income taxes
more than it usually will increase those of the donee.
The rates under the North Carolina statute are the same as those
of our inheritance tax," but as our primary death tax is imposed on
each beneficiary for his respective gift the saving of taxes by a partial
division of the estate during the donor's life will not be as great as
under the federal taxes. Unlike the federal tax the rates under our act
vary according to the relationship between the donor and the donee. 12
Where the gift is small a saving may be obtained in this state similar to
that under the federal act, by gaining the advantage of lower brackets in
the income tax.

IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156)nn.

• S.
S C.A. §551 (1935).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Mchie,-Supp. 1937) §7880(156)ee.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(3)-(5).
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II. EXEMPTIONS 2 -- (a) Small gifts. The federal act provides
that the first $5,000 of any gift given to any donee during the calendar
year need not be included in the tax return of the total amount of gifts
made during such year.13 Thus a donor may give away an infinite
amount of property each year tax-free so long as gifts to any one donee
are limited to $5,000. There is no comparable provision in the North
Carolina law. In fact, no mention is made of exempting gifts, however
small, to a stranger. Hence, following the literal terms of our act, a

gift of as trivial an amount as $1 or property of that value would subject the donor to a tax on such gift. The omission to provide an
exemption for these small gifts was undoubtedly an oversight on the
part of the legislature. Every other state that has enacted a gift tax
has provided that such gifts need not be listed in the donor's tax return. 14

(b) Specific exemptions-Provision is made in the federal statute
for a specific exemption of $40,000. This may be used by the donor in
one year or piecemeal over a period of years until the amounts so used
total $40,000.15 This exemption should not be confused with the unlimited exemption already mentioned which is applicable to small gifts
of $5,000 or less. North Carolina has provided for no specific exemption comparable with that of the federal act. Oregon, which provides
"=There is no recurring-tax provision in the gift tax act such as that set
forth in the inheritance tax law. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(12).
Accordingly gifts by A to B of property lately received by A as a gift from
another are taxable.
147 STAT. 247 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §553(b) (1935). "Gifts less than $5,000.
In the case of gifts (other than of future interests in property) made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $5,000 of such gifts to such
person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total amount
of gifts made during such year."
1
COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) c. 75A §9. "...
no return shall be
required in event the transfer by gift to any one person or corporation in any
calendar year shall be less than $500, and the first $500 of any such transfer to
any person or corporation during any calendar year shall be deemed not to be a
gift for any purposes under this chapter." The Minnesota statute provides that
the first $2,500 of value in gifts (other than oi future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during any calendar year is exempt from the
tax. C. C. H. Inher. Estate and Gift Tax Serv. f115,045; OnE. CODE ANN. (Supp.
1935) 69 c. 16 §1604. "Gifts less than one thousand dollars ($1,000). In case
of gifts (other than of future interests in property) made to any person by the
donor during the calendar year, the first one thousand of such gifts to such
person shall not, for the purposes of subsection (a) be included in the total
amount of gifts made during such year." VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) app.
tax code §120(1). "... . So much of such property as has the actual value of one
thousand dollars and so passes to or for the use of any class C beneficiary shall
be exempt from taxation hereunder."
(Class C is explained previously as including everyone not included in class A or B.); C. C. H. Inher. Estate anti
Gift Tax Serv. 15,107 (Property of the clear value of $1,000 transferred to any
donee in any calendar year is exempt under Wis. statute).
'349 STAT. 1025 (1935), 26 U. S. C. A. §554(1) (Supp. 1936). "In computing
net gifts for any calendar year there shall be allowed as deductions: . . . (a) (1)
Specific exemption. An exemption of $40,000, less the aggregate of the amounts
claimed and allowed as specific exemption for preceding calendar years."
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a specific exemption of $10,000, is the only state to follow the federal
act in granting such an exemption in addition to the exclusion of small
16
gifts.
(c) Personal exemptions-This class of exemptions includes those
gifts made to donees who are usually dependent financially upon the
donor or connected with him by close blood ties. The federal act, paralleling in theory the federal estate tax, provides for no personal exemptions. Both federal taxes fall upon the donor, and the specific exemptions granted him in both cases bear no relation to the class of the recipient. Though the North Carolina inheritance and gift taxes both
provide personal but no specific exemptions, the former tax is levied
upon the donee while the donor must bear the latter.
The North Carolina act specifies that the exemptions shall be the
same as those set out in the inheritance tax, except that the gift tax
statute allows an exemption of $5,000 to each child in any one year,
while under the inheritance tax only minor children are allowed that
much. Adult children are granted but $2,000.17 The attempt to enact
the gift tax partially by new provisions and partially by referring to and
incorporating inheritance tax provisions has resulted in several inconsistencies. For example, the inheritance tax provides -that grandchildren of the decedent are allowed collectively the same exemption as their
parent whether he be living or deceased.18 But in the gift tax it is provided that grandchildren of the donor are allowed collectively the same
exemption as their parent where such parent is deceased.19 Thus, interpreting the gift tax strictly, the grandchildren of the donor would not
be allowed the same exemption as their parent unless such parent was
deceased at the time of the gift. This inconsistency is undoubtedly the
result of faulty draftsmanship and officials of the department of revenue
have indicated that in regard to inter vivos gifts to the donor's grandchildren, the same exemptions will be allowed whether the parent be
living or deceased.
The gift tax specifies no exemptions on gifts to the donor's spouse,
while the inheritance tax provides for an exemption of $10,000 for be' ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) 69-1605. "In computing net gifts for any calendar year there shall be allowed as deductions: (a) Specific Exemption. A
specific exemption of ten thousand dollars [$10,000.], less the aggregate of the
amounts
claimed and allowed as specific exemption for preceding calendar years."
17
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(3)-(5). Those entitled to
exemptions under the inheritance tax are as follows: minor children, $5,000 each;
adult children, $2,000 each; widow, $10,000; widower, $2,000; grandchildren collectively the same exemption as their parent. Lineal issue or lineal ancestors not
specifically mentioned above are allowed $2,000 each.
2 0N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,. Supp. 1937) §7880(3).
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156)ee. "...
Children of a
deceased parent shall be allowed collectively the same amount of exemption as a
child of the donor!'
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quests to a decedent's widow and $2,000 on bequests to a widower.
Did the legislature intend that the same exemptions applicable to bequests between spouses should also apply to gifts between them? Here
again the tax officials have informed the writer that the act will be interpreted as applying like exemptions in both cases. There is no apparent
reason why some exemptions should not be allowed on gifts between
21
spouses. Other states have specifically provided such exemptions.
The next question is the extent to which these personal exemptions
are allowable. The statutes of other jurisdictions specify in clear language whether they are allowable annually or but once.22 The North
Carolina act states, "The total exemptions that may be allowed under
this section shall not exceed eight times the exemption allowed for a
single year." 28 While this provision may be subject to one or more interpretations it seems safer to say that it would be construed to mean
that the total exemptions allowed to any one donee would be eight times
the exemption allowed to such donee for any one year. This would
seem to be the logical construction in view of the fact that the exemptions to all donees are not the same. For example, if donor A wanted
to make a series of gifts to each of his children and to his father, he
would be allowed to give each child $40,000 and his father $16,000. This
is the construction that is placed upon this provision by the Department
of Revenue. In order to take advantage of the maximum allowed, the
gifts must be spread over a minimum period of eight years. And according to the revenue officials no "swapping" of exemptions from one
donee to another is allowed.
(d) Charitable exemptions-In enumerating the class of donees to
' See note 18, supra.
'CoLo.
STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) c. 75A §5. "Transfers to a wife

shall be taxable only to the extent that the value of the property transferred exceeds twenty thousand ($20,000.00) dollars and transfers to any other person in
Class A [this includes husband] shall be taxable only to the extent that the value
of the property exceeds ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars."; Minn. Laws 1st Spec.
Sess. 1937, c. 70 (wife $10,000, husband $10,000) ; Ore. Laws 1937, c. 250 (donor
entitled to annual exemption of $5,000 from the total amount of gifts made to
the spouse) ; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) app. tax code §120(1). "So much of
such property as has the actual value of five thousand dollars and so passes to or
for the use of any class A beneficiary [hu~band and wife are included under this
class] shall be exempt from taxation hereunder."; C. C. H. Inher. Estate and
Gift Tax Serv. 1115,107 (personal exemptions of $15,000 to the wife and $2,000 to
the husband under Wis. statute).
'CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) c. 75A §5. "The exemption, at the
option of the donor or donors may be taken in its entirety in a single year, or be
spread over a period of five years in such amounts as he or they see fit, but after
the limit has been reached no further exemption is allowable."; Minn. Laws 1st
Spec. Sess. 1937, c. 70 (exemptions allowed once) ; Ore. Laws 1937, c. 250 (The
donor is entitled to an annual exemption of $5,000 from the total amount of gifts
made during the calendar year to each donee, etc.); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1936) app. tax code §120(1) (No mention is made as to the extent of the exemptions, but the implication from the act is that they are allowable yearly) ; Wis.
Laws 1933, c. 363 §4(6) (full exemptions allowed once; annually thereafter an
exemption equal to one-fifth the full exemptions).
3N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156)ee.
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which charitable gifts may be made the federal act follows almost verbatint the provisions of the federal estate tax 24 The donees listed in the
North Carolina act 25 are practically the same as those of our inheritance
tax, except that there, is no specific mention made in the gift tax, in the
language of the inheritance tax, 26 of exempting transfers made to institutions incorporated in other states which receive and disburse funds
donated in this state. While the provisions of the gift tax2 7 and the
inheritance tax are verbally dissimilar, yet the purposes of the two
are similar and it is likely that the court will make no distinction in
their construction.
In both the federal tax and North Carolina tax charitable gifts may
be deducted only if the charitable gifts are first included in the report of
the total gifts for the year.2 8 The amounts which may be given are unlimited and this exemption is exclusive of all other exemptions. In both
the federal and North Carolina acts no provision is made for deductions
on charitable gifts to individuals.
III. COMPUTATION-The federal tax is unique in that in ascertaining the rates applicable to the net gifts of any year, the gifts of
the donor for all preceding years back to and including the calendar year
1932 must be considered. 29 The first step in the determination of the
tax is to ascertain the amount of net gifts for the calendar year. Gifts
of $5,000 or less made to any beneficiary, as already pointed out, need
" 47 STAT. 247 (1932), 48 STAT. 760 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. §554(a) (2)
(1935) (gift tax) ; 44 STAT. 72 (1926), 47 STAT. 282 (1932), 48 STAT. 755 (1934),
26 U. S. C. A. §412(d) (1935) (estate tax). In both taxes in order for the donor
to deduct the gift the donee must meet three tests: (1) It must be organized and
operated for one or more of the purposes specified in the statute; (2) it must be
organized and operated exclusively for such purpose or purposes; and (3) no
part of its earnings shall inure to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156)ee. ". . . so much of
such property as shall pass exclusively .... for charitable, educational or religious
purposes within this state, and so much of such property as shall so pass for the
exclusive benefit of any institution, association, or corporation in this state, the
property of which is exempt from taxation by the laws of this state, shall be
exempt from any and all taxation under the provisions of this article."
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(2) (c). "Property passing
to religious, educational, or charitable corporations, not conducted for profit, incorporated under the laws of any other state, and receiving and disbursing funds
donated in this state for religious, educational, or charitable purposes." (Note:
Taken literally it would be sufficient if the donee merely received funds donated in
this state. It would likely be construed as meaning the donee must also disburse
the funds in North Carolina.)
I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156) ee. "... ithe property of
which is exempt from taxation by the laws, of this state [italics ours], shall be
exempt from any and all taxation under the provisions of this article!' This
would seem to be referring to N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §§7971
(129) (8), (130) (8).
147 STAT. 247 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §554(c) (1935); N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156)ee. While accomplishing the same result, the federal statute handles -this situation by means of a deduction; the North Carolina act
by means of an exemption.
2147 STAT. 246

(1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §551 (1935).
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not be considered in the return, nor the first $5,000 of any larger gift. In
ascertaining the total net gifts for the year so much of the $40,000
specific exemption as the donor prefers to use during that year may be
deducted from the total of all gifts made during such year. Charitable
gifts are included in the return but may then be deducted when they
meet the statutory requirements. After following the above steps the
donor will have reached the total net gifts for the year. But before
computing the tax he must compile a total of all net gifts made for the
preceding years beginning with 1932. The net gifts for the preceding
years are then added to the net gifts of the current year. On this total
the tax is figured at the current rates. But before arriving at the final
amount a tax figured only on the gifts for the preceding years, at the
present rate, is subtracted therefrom.
There is some doubt as to whether or not the North Carolina tax is
cumulative. Our act specifies, ". . . where two or more gifts are made
in excess of the exemption the tax shall be calculated on the total
amount of gifts in excess of the exemption. '80 This may be construed to
mean that where taxable gifts are made to the same beneficiary in different years, the tax will be computed on the total amount of taxable gifts;
then, after subtracting the amount of tax for taxable gifts in prior years,
the difference will amount to the tax for the current year. 31 Thus by
following the above interpretation the same method of computation
would be employed as under the federal act. Literally the act seems to
say that the tax is to be computed on the total of all taxable gifts made
for "the current year. But to follow this construction in all cases would
result in a mathematical impossibility because different rates are applicable to different donees, and where gifts were made to members of different classes no common table could be used in computing the total.
It also seems unlikely that the legislature intended the tax to be cumulative as between years, without an express statement to this effect,
ini
view of the great difference in amounts resulting from the two methods of computation. It is more probable that this provision will be
construed to mean that in computing the tax for any year, a total of all
taxable gifts made to one donee for that year will be the basis for such
computations.
Although under the North Carolina act the rates are the same for
both the inheritance and the gift taxes, in the computation the tax on
the gifts will actually figure less. For example, donor A bequeaths
$100,000 to donee B, a stranger. The tax falls upon B and would be
computed on the entire $100,000 even though B would only receive
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7880(156)ee.
' This is the view taken by Prof. Charles L. B. Lowndes of the Duke Univer-

sity Law School. (1937) 64
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$89,850 after paying the tax of $10,150. But if A gave B $89,850 by
inter hivos gift the tax would fall upon A and amount to only $9,
033.50. Thus if the gift had been made inter vivos, $1,116.50 would
have been saved.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES-By reason of the difficulties of
construction to which the present act is subject, it is proposed that
several changes be made by the next legislature. Furthermore, other
suggestions will be made which should add to the effectiveness of the
tax and enlarge the revenue to be derived therefrom.
Before passing such a tax it would seem logical to consider the underlying purpose for its enactment. If its sole purpose is to produce
added revenue for the state treasury then there can be seen no reason
why the rates and exemptions should be the same as those of the inheritance tax, because both historically and practically there is little
similarity between the right of an individual to transfer property by
inter vivos gift and the right to bequeath it by testamentary disposition.
If the purpose of the tax is to prevent the escape from inheritance taxes
then the rates and exemptions of both taxes should be practically the
same. If, however, there is the additional purpose of encouraging the
immediate "splitting up" of large estates then the rates of the tax should
be lower than those of the inheritance tax and the exemptions more
32

liberal.

The present tax will likely produce little revenue on account of the
liberal personal exemptions that are allowed. In the majority of cases
it is improbable that the state will derive one cent.
For example if donor A had five children, a wife, and both parents
living he would be able to give, over a period 'of eight years, property
tax-free to the value of $40,000 to each of his five children, $80,000 to
his wife, and $16,000 to each of his parents, a grand total of $312,000 !.
As someone has said, "A is allowed to die eight times." If A decided
to dispose of this property by testamentary disposition a total of only
$39,000 would be exempt from the inheritance tax. Hence, assuming
that the legislature attempted to prevent escape from our inheritance
tax, the above hypothetical case illustrates the futility of this attempt,
except with respect to estates measured in millions. To prevent
the transfer of. large amounts of property tax-free it is proposed
that the personal exemptions be allowed but once with respect to
each beneficiary. It is further proposed that a specific exemption be
I See Magill, Federal Regulation of Family Settlentents (1937) 4 U. OF CHr.

L. Rav. 265. Under the North Carolina Revenue Law when property has been
given and the gift tax paid, that property is not later to be included for inheritance taxation in the donor's estate, even, it seems, if the gift turns out to have
been made in contemplation of death. See N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937)
§7880(1) (third).
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allowed which could be used with respect to gifts to donees not entitled
under the statute to personal exemptions. Many such gifts should be
encouraged regardless of the relationship between the donor and donee.
The amount could be set at a figure smaller than any of those allowed to
donees entitled to personal exemptions. By specifying that this exemption be allowable only on gifts to strangers the total already allowed for
personal exemptions would not be increased.
That the tax should provide an exemption on all gifts of small or
trifling value, as a matter of practical convenience, seems hardly debatable. As previously pointed out, the present act exempts no gift, however small in value, unless made to one of a class entitled to personal
exemptions. Department Of Revenue officials admit the impossibility of
enforcing the present law in this respect. Cases are likely to arise
where the donor and the tax officials will disagree as to the insignificance of a particular gift. Without a statutory line of demarcation it
would be difficult to predict where insignificance ends and substantiality
begins. The Colorado statute specifies, ". . . the first $500 of any such
transfer to any person or corporation during any calendar year shall be
deemed not to be a gift ....,,33 While it would seem reasonable to relieve the donor from listing all gifts of $500 or less, there is apparently
no reason for following the Colorado statute to the extent of exempting
the first $500 where the gift is of a larger amount. The purpose of
such a provision should be to exempt trifling gifts and not to extend the
exemption on larger amounts.
As has been pointed out, the table of rates provided by reference to
the inheritance tax has proved to be impracticable. Any single table,
however ingeniously drawn, would hardly be workable for both taxes
on account of the obvious differences in the two. A new and separate
table of exemptions and rates shoidd be devised for the gift tax.
It is further suggested that the date when the tax falls due be
changed from March the fifteenth, because both the income tax and the
tax on intangible personal property are due on this date, and the payment of these taxes at one time will work an undue hardship on the
taxpayer. In most cases a person taxable under the gift tax would also
be~taxed on income and intangible personal property. Such a change
would materially benefit the taxpayer, yet in no way prejudice the
HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.
state.
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